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INTRODUCTION

Can a video game developer or publisher successfully sue a
video game player for copyright infringement for not “playing a
game nicely,” “cheating,” or “buying software from a third party”?
This article suggests a new reason why it cannot.
The founding social contract of the new millennium is the End
User License Agreement (EULA), not the U.S. Constitution.
Website terms of use (TOU) and software EULAs now have an
enormous impact on how citizens must act and how their rights
and redresses are defined. EULAs contain not only traditional
1
intellectual property licensing conditions but complicated
directives regarding what members of online communities can say,
how they must act, what they can do, with whom they can transact
2
business, and whether they can own the fruits of their own labor.
The question that has been before academics for a long time, and
before courts for a shorter time, is how far these contracts can go in
controlling the property and dignitary interests of contractual

1. See Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UT
F8&nodeId=200506200 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (“Upon your download of Digital
Content and payment . . . [Amazon] grants you a non-exclusive right to view, use,
and display such Digital Content an unlimited number of times, solely on the
Kindle or a Reading Application or as otherwise permitted as part of the Service . .
. . Digital Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.”).
2. See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENTM’T,
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last updated Oct.
29, 2010) [hereinafter World of Warcraft EULA] (“All title, ownership rights and
intellectual property rights in and to the Game and all copies thereof (including
without limitation any . . . characters . . . concepts, artwork, character inventories .
. . and any related documentation) are owned or licensed by Blizzard.”). In the
World of Warcraft EULA, the ability to permanently transfer all rights and
obligations under the EULA of the game is detailed. Id. (explaining that a
transfer is allowed so long as you transfer the physical copy with all the
documentation that came with it, delete all copies on your computer and in your
possession, and the transferee agrees to the EULA); see also, e.g., Second Life Terms of
Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last updated Dec.
15, 2010) [hereinafter Second Life EULA] (outlining the rights and responsibilities
of Linden Lab and end users). Specifically, section 4.5 of the Second Life EULA
states that Linden Lab owns the Server data and is not liable for service
interruptions or loss of data. Id. This is subject to section 7.1, which recognizes
end users’ pre-existing intellectual property rights. Id. Section 6 specifies that
“virtual land” is owned by Linden Lab and that it is licensed to the user. Id.
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communities. 3 The consequences of this legal debate are
4
immediate and personal, although the law governing these rules is
always in flux and sometimes incoherent. You may “jailbreak” your
5
iPhone or “root” your droid without implicating copyright issues
no matter what your license says. But if you “mod” your PlayStation
3 (PS3) in violation of your software license agreement (or, worse,
6
show others how to do so), then you risk a major lawsuit.
3. See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and
Society on the Cyberian Frontier 4, 30 (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618, 2001),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828
(discussing the lack of distinct protections for property rights in virtual property
because of EULAs, despite the scale of virtual worlds); see also Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (detailing the novel issues
presented by the relationship between the creator and user of a virtual world, as
created by the Linden Lab’s EULA). But see Will Knight, Gamer Wins Back Virtual
Booty in Court Battle, NEWSCIENTIST (Dec. 23, 2003, 14:37), http://
www.newscientist.com/article/dn4510-gamer-wins-back-virtualbooty-in-courtbattle.html (discussing Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology Development Co., a
case in which a Chinese court ordered a virtual-world company to return the
virtual property to a player whose account had been hacked and looted).
4. See Knight, supra note 3; see also Dutch Court Rules Virtual Theft Is Real,
RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (Oct. 22, 2008, 3:04 PM), http://www.rnw.nl
/english/article/dutch-court-rules-virtual-theft-real (reporting a case from
Germany in which two boys threatened a classmate with a knife until he agreed to
transfer virtual items to their account in the online game, Runescape); Mike
Musgrove, Tokyo Woman Jailed for Avatar “Murder,” WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2008,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/10/tokyo_woman_jailed_for_a
vatar.html?nav=rss_blog.
5. Rooting, or jailbreaking, is the process of installing an application on a
phone that has not been approved by the phone’s manufacturer. See Debra
Littlejohn Shinder, Pros and Cons of Jailbreaking or Rooting Your Smartphone,
TECHREPUBLIC SMARTPHONES (Aug. 20, 2010, 8:00 PM PDT), http://
www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/pros-and-cons-of-jailbreaking-orrooting-your-smartphone/1460.
While jailbraking is no longer illegal, the
jailbraking exception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) does not
address the likely breach of contract between you and, for example, Apple, should
you jailbreak your iPhone. Id. So, your warranty may be voided and Apple or
Google can issue a patch to “fix” your jailbreaking or rooting. Id. Your phone can
also be bricked. Id. This is where the smartphone basically locks up and either
requires new hardware due to software corruption or complex repair (in effect,
turning your cell phone into a $400 “brick”). Id.
6. Compare Exemption to Prohibition Against Circumvention, 37 C.F.R. §
201.40 (2010) [hereinafter Jailbreak Exemption] (creating the “jail-breaking”
exception rule that does not force smartphone makers to permit jail-breaking but
makes it lawful to circumvent controls designed to block jail-breaking), with 37
C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4) (2010) (providing an exception for video games where the
circumvention is for good faith testing, investigating, or correcting of security
issues provided the information from the testing is used in such a way that does
not aid in copyright infringement), and Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz,
No. CV11 0167, 2011 WL 347137 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (initiating an action
against a programmer for modifying a PS3; in order for defendant Hotz to prevail,
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The only way to understand this area of law is to identify the
legal questions at the center of the debate because, while the
answers courts give to these questions are not stable, the questions
themselves have been. The center of the debate is the interaction
between the grant of exclusive rights in the core provisions of the
Copyright Act and the later additions by the Digital Millennium
7
Copyright Act (DMCA) —the statute that protects technological
8
The connection
locks against technological circumvention.
between contracts and technological measures is direct but not
immediately clear. Contracts that restrict access to software are
legally enforceable documents, but also technological protective
9
measures that control access to copyrighted material. This creates
a catch-22 for the end user: either the end user clicks through the
10
EULA and gives up a panoply of rights, often including fair use,
the modifications made must enable the PS3 to work with other programs and not
facilitate copyright infringement).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing to a copyright owner exclusive
rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform, and display
their copyrighted work); MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938,
942–43, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (outlining the exclusive rights under § 106 and, later,
the goals of the DMCA with copyright enforcement in the digital age and
ultimately finding a new anti-circumvention right); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528, 533, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing
the relationships between rights under the Copyright Act and the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, and determining that the anti-circumvention provisions
do not grant a new right); Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1192–1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (interpreting the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provisions, looking to the Copyright Act, Congressional intent, and finding the
anti-circumvention provisions created a new cause of action and not a new right
where circumvention is infringement and copyright protection would be
implicated).
8. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1998)). The DMCA
contains three provisions that create a framework to address circumvention of
technological measures that protect copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. §§
1201(a)(1)–(2), 1201(b)(1) (2006).
9. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)
(describing that UCC 2-204(1) provides for different formations of contracts, such
as a prompt on a computer screen, which can prevent access). “ProCD proposed a
contract that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an
opportunity to read the license at leisure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no
choice, because the software splashed the license on the screen and would not let
him proceed without indicating acceptance.” Id. If you fail to click agree and still
use the software, then you have circumvented a technological measure. See 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
10. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181
(E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“The defendants in this case waived their ‘fair use’ right to reverse

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/12

4

Fairfield: Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Vi

2011]

NEXUS CRYSTALS

47

or the end user circumvents the contract and is liable for that
11
circumvention under the DMCA.
The question is whether corporations can use EULAs to
control consumer behavior that has little or nothing to do with
copyright. It is clear that a copyright license that restricts a licensee
from making copies makes use of a power that Congress intended
12
to give to copyright holders. It is less clear that Congress intended
to permit companies to turn actions such as “being rude while
playing a video game,” “criticizing the game company while
commenting on game message boards,” or “cheating while playing
a game” into copyright infringements. Companies can, of course,
13
contract with users to use the software in certain ways, but it is not
at all certain that any resulting breach of contract claims should be
transformed into copyright infringements and/or DMCA
violations.
A number of courts have therefore held that there must be a
“nexus” between a license restriction that a corporation seeks to
engineer by agreeing to the licensing agreement.”); Bowers v. Baystate Techs.,
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (detailing that private parties are
able to contract out of the limited ability to reverse engineer software—a fair use
under the exemptions of the Copyright Act).
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title.”).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006) (granting federal copyright protection
to authors of “original works of authorship”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006)
(providing for the exclusive right to reproduce work that is copyrighted). But see
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (providing for the essential step defense unique to
the software context). The owner may make copies to their computer’s random
access memory (RAM) where it is essential to the use of that software in
conjunction with the machine and is used in no other way. See also 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) (2006) (providing for the first sale doctrine where a lawful owner of a copy
of a copyrighted work is able, without the permission of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of the relevant copy). The first sale
doctrine allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies. Id.
Both of these affirmative defenses are limited to owners of copyrighted works. Id.
13. See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir.
2010) (detailing Blizzard’s TOU and the prohibition of cheats, hacks, or other
third-party software, essentially requiring fair play); Apple, iPOD Software License
¶
2(a)
(July
20,
2010),
Agreement
Single
Use
License,
APPLE,
http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/ipod.pdf [hereinafter iPOD SLA]
(restricting the use of the iPOD software to use on one iPOD). “[Y]ou may not
copy, decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, attempt to derive the source code
of, decrypt, modify, or create derivative works of the iPod Software, iPod Software
Updates, or any part thereof.” Id. ¶ 2(c).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12

48

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

enforce on penalty of DMCA violation and some right granted by
14
the Copyright Act. The Ninth Circuit has held otherwise: a clause
unconnected to any core right granted by the Act would be
enforceable as a copyright infringement if the user violated the
EULA and as a DMCA violation if the user either circumvented the
EULA or sought to avoid surveillance programs, such as Blizzard’s
15
Warden, intended to enforce these contractual clauses.
Yet the Ninth Circuit has now recently recognized the
dissonance caused by permitting corporations to turn every breach
of contract into a claim for copyright infringement, an
16
infringement of the DMCA, or even a criminal hacking claim. In
14. See Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (ruling that a copyright owner who seeks to impose liability on an
accused circumventor must show a “reasonable relationship” between the
circumvention and a protected interest under the Copyright Act of the copyright
owner); see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202–03)
(“[Section 1201] prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship
to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”).
“If such a nexus were not required, the careful balance that Congress sought to
achieve between the ‘interests of content creators and information users’ would be
upset.” Id. at 1319 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 1, at 26 (1998)); Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004)
(detailing that a technological measure must control access to a work falling under
the general copyright protection of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). “To the extent the Toner
Loading Program is not a ‘work protected under [the copyright statute],’ the
DMCA necessarily would not protect it.” Id. at 550. The court is finding a need
for a technological measure, such as an EULA, to be a protected right under 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). See, e.g., ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996). If the technological measure does not fall under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2006), then a violation, or circumvention, of it would not be a copyright
infringement.
15. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that a copy made by a licensee is a violation of the license
agreement and is also a copyright infringement). See infra note 16 for a
discussion of the RAM copy doctrine. In MAI, the purchaser was a licensee, not an
owner, and therefore not able to use the affirmative defense of “essential step.”
MAI Sys. Corp., 911 F.2d at 519; see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that defendant was a licensee of the
software and therefore infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by copying the software
and installing it on several computers, in violation of the license agreement);
Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
16. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941 (discussing the RAM copy doctrine
loosely). “This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than
Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners.” Id. at 941. The Ninth
Circuit created the RAM copy doctrine in MAI. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d. at 519.
The court determined that copies made to the computers’ RAM were a copy
under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Id. The court also found that
MAI’s copyright was violated by the licensee, Peak, through the unlicensed use of
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a recent case, MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit adopted a novel approach to contractual
construction that may serve to separate “play nice” contract clauses
17
from “don’t illegally copy” core copyright license terms.
This article argues that such an approach might serve as a
“nexus crystal”; a doctrinal catalyst around which doctrines that
take seriously these important issues of consumer control could
crystallize. MDY does not adopt a nexus test for DMCA claims in
18
But it nevertheless succeeds in separating
the Ninth Circuit.
social control from copyright licensing through a closer
examination of the contractual clauses themselves; it does so by
arguing that a mere rule of social control (“play nice”) is a
contractual condition and not a condition of the intellectual
property license.
This article proceeds in three parts. The first part discusses
some pertinent legal literature and case law concerning the
contractual control of online communities. The second part
discusses case law that I believe describes coalescing limits on
contractual control. One limit is familiar: some circuits require a
nexus between a DMCA-protected technological lock and the
exercise of some right granted by the Copyright Act to the
copyright holder with respect to the locked-up material. But a
second limit is potentially significantly more far-reaching: a
contractual construction that limits the kinds of social control a
copyright holder can exercise via mass-market consumer contracts
of adhesion. Simply put, can software providers require their massmarket consumers to not criticize the company on public forums or
to not do business with an aftermarket software provider, as
conditions of the intellectual property license? This article argues
19
that they cannot and that the MDY decision is one of the first
MAI’s software. Id. The RAM copy doctrine makes it a copyright violation to
violate any term of a license agreement where the software is copied into the
computer’s RAM. Id. “The rationale would be that because the conduct occurs
while the player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM in order for it
to run, the violation is copyright infringement.” MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941.
Typically, a license does not allow for copies of the game into the computers RAM.
Only owners are afforded the essential step defense. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,
621 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010).
17. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939 (setting out the contractual terms that
limit the scope of a license as a “condition” and all other license terms as
“covenants”).
18. Id. at 952.
19. It is worth underscoring that these kinds of community control clauses
are not completely invalid—violations of the clauses may still be a breach of
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cases to confront this issue head-on and resolve it correctly.
The third part examines the district and appellate decisions in
MDY v. Blizzard and discusses how the court navigates the labyrinth
between copyright holders’ rights and their ability to dictate
patterns of social behavior to online communities under threat of
copyright infringement. I then offer some conclusions.
II. CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OF ONLINE COMMUNITIES
The legal literature has previously addressed issues of
contractual control from several distinct angles: the angle of the
DMCA’s new anti-circumvention right, the angle of digital first sale
and the “essential step” defense, the angle of contractual
interpretation, and the angle of the Communications Decency Act
20
I will discuss
(CDA) immunity and anticompetition concerns.
each literature in turn before concluding that the contractual
construction approach is the most under-theorized and thus most
useful, new analysis for determining the reach and role of EULA
terms in governing online conduct.
A. The Legal Background
There are several distinct legal approaches worth noting. A
good place to start is the academic and juridical discussion over the
reach of the grant of rights in § 106 of the Copyright Act to
copyright holders and the defenses in §§ 109 and 117 of fair usage
21
and “essential steps.” Secondly, the interaction of the DMCA with
these basic grants has, legal academics argue, caused a significant
22
diminution in rights granted to consumers by the Copyright Act.
contract, even though they do not constitute intellectual property infringement.
However, when I play a video game in a mean way, killing the avatar of the same
player over and over again (a practice called “camping” and “griefing”) in
violation of the Terms of Use, I have breached a contract, not violated the
Copyright Act.
20. See, e.g., Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586580; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-social
Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 435–36
(2008); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 493, 495,
535 (2005).
21. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 776–80,
784–87 (9th Cir. 2006); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair
Use: Let the Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK. L. REV 539,
539–42, 576 (2004).
22. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright
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A third legal literature discusses the impact of using mass-market
consumer contracts to regulate shifting multi-million-member
23
online communities. It is this literature that I think bears the
most fruit in the current context, given that the MDY court’s
decision turned on contractual interpretation grounds.
24
and
Statutory
immunizations
for
providers
antritrust/anticompetition concerns are also two other sources of
law worth mentioning, although they have a more muted role in
these cases. Courts and academics have addressed the tension
between the CDA’s broad immunization of providers’ breaches of
contract and the broad promises (to create a safe environment
online, to police bad actors, or to screen potential online dates with
background checks) that providers make but are not required to
25
26
27
enforce. Finally, copyright misuse and anticompetition claims
comprise a hefty undercurrent, if not a major theme, in this area of
Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 281 n.10 (2001) (“As a practical matter,
the survival of the limitations on copyright owner’s rights, as set out in Chapter 1
of the Copyright Act of 1976, including the ‘first sale’ doctrine, and exemptions
provided for by § 110, will now be available purely at the discretion of the
copyright owner.”).
23. See Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn
of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 287–94 (2007) (discussing the role of contracts
in virtual worlds, specifically EULAs); see also Fairfield, supra note 20, at 432
(covering the role of contracts in virtual worlds and why they are problematic
because they supplant the common law process and default rules).
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
25. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2009)
(refusing to dismiss claims pursuant to § 230 because plaintiff established a prima
facie case of promissory estoppel); see also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield
for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010) (detailing the first
empirical study of § 230 and how it has been applied by courts, in the end
haphazardly, with a mixed outcome for providers); Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity:
Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172–
76, 201 (2006) (discussing the Communications Decency Act’s (CDA) background
and its problems and fitting it with Wikipedia to avoid liability).
26. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191,
197 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the fair use doctrine may be implicated if
copyright misuse will stifle the very creativity that the copyright law was designed to
foster); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding that conditioning the license on a promise not to use competitors’
products constituted a misuse of the copyright); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970, 978–79 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the copyright holder misused
its copyright by including in licensing agreements a provision that neither the
licensee company nor its officers and employees could develop competing goods
for the term of the ninety-nine year agreement).
27. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 204 (“Anti-competitive licensing agreements
may conflict with the purpose behind a copyright’s protection by depriving the
public of the would-be competitor’s creativity.”).
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law. The contracts we are talking about almost invariably forbid a
consumer from doing business with the seller’s aftermarket rival.
Although antitrust has been given short shrift in information
technology cases, usually because of the argument that the speed of
the information industry does away with the need for antitrust
28
the subtext of these cases is clearly one of
controls,
anticompetition and thus this legal approach should be addressed.
This section addresses each of the above legal approaches briefly,
by way of providing background, before proceeding to Part B for a
closer look at some of the key cases.
1.

The Copyright Act’s Basic Limits on Contractual Control

The judicial interpretation of the basic grants and defenses of
the Copyright Act remains in motion. The first set of articles and
decisions discussing the limits of contractual control of online
communities concerns the limits set out in the Copyright Act itself
in §§ 109 and 117. These sections establish the first sale doctrine
and its ancillary “essential step” defense. First sale is the doctrine
that limits the copyright holder’s rights to the first sale of a copy of
copyrighted materials; after that first sale, she has exhausted her
29
rights and cannot control what is done with the book. Thus, for
example, after my uncle finished his anatomy and physiology class
in medical school, he took his textbook out to a field and shot it.
That was his right, since he owned that copy of the textbook. The
attendant right of taking an “essential step” was created by
Congress to permit an owner of software to load a copy of the
software without permission of the copyright holder if doing so was
30
an essential step to use of the software.
The first sale doctrine and essential step defense might at first
blush seem to limit the control that intellectual property holders

28. STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 246, 256 (2001) (discussing the
fears over anticompetitive behaviors, such as decreased supply and rising prices,
but noting that the reality is that software prices have dropped and supplies have
increased). Liebowitz and Margolis argue that antitrust controls then are
misplaced in the software context of the pace of innovation and the reality that
where products are better, they will succeed but where they are inferior, they will
fail. Id. For a broad treatment of the idea of path dependence and network
effects and their frailty according to Liebowitz and Margolis, refer to chapters one
and two.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).
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can assert over their customers. 31 This is because the owner of a
copy of software is nominally free to dispose of it as she sees fit
(thus eliminating any restrictive aftermarket controls placed on it
by the copyright holder) and because owners of the software are
free to load the software into random access memory (RAM) as an
32
essential step of using the software.
The first sale doctrine and essential step defense have been
severely eroded by a controversial line of cases rooted in the Ninth
33
Circuit’s decision in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. MAI
held that a repair person made an illicit copy of a computer
program—and violated the Copyright Act—merely by turning a
34
The court reasoned that when a user turns a
computer on.
computer on, the user copies the software from read only memory
35
(ROM) into RAM and thus makes a copy. If, at that moment, the
copy made into RAM is contemporaneous with some action that
violates the terms of the license agreement, then the resulting RAM
copy constitutes copyright infringement. This is termed the RAM
36
copy doctrine.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006). These two
statutory rights limit MAI’s RAM copy doctrine. See supra note 16 for a discussion
of the RAM copy doctrine. Under the RAM copy doctrine, a license agreement
can specify that a user is not allowed to make copies, but if it is determined by the
court that the purchaser is an owner and not a licensee, then they are able to
make copies, in contravention of the license agreement. The weight under the
RAM copy doctrine is on the license agreement, where the affirmative defenses of
first sale and essential step place the weight on whether the software is owned or
licensed. For these defenses, the license agreement by itself is not dispositive. Cf.
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that some
contracts, “consistent with their designation as loans or licenses,” are not sales).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).
33. 991 F.2d at 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ince we find that the copy
created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,’
we hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the
Copyright Act.”). This copy is then subject to the anti-circumvention regime
under the DMCA. See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 942–46
(9th Cir. 2010); see also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109–11 (9th Cir.
2010) (discussing the essential step defense); Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the essential step
defense did not apply because defendant was not an owner of the software and
plaintiff’s license imposed significant restrictions).
34. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518–19.
35. Id. at 518.
36. The RAM copy doctrine has fared differently in different circuits. See
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding that an embodiment and durational requirement needed to be met in
order for a data stream to be fixed). The Second Circuit’s decision presented an
apparent circuit split that the parties to Cartoon Network wanted addressed. See
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34719, CARTOON NETWORK LP V. CSC
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The RAM copy doctrine first gutted the protections that § 109
granted to owners of a particular copy of software. The problem is
that courts have (in my opinion) misconstrued the Copyright Act
and have permitted private contracts to undo what Congress did.
Courts rely on the fiction that the buyer of software is not really the
37
The
owner but merely the licensee of the software.
legal literature focuses on the question of whether buyers of
software are truly owners of that copy of the software or whether
38
the reservation of a license precludes ownership. It may seem
obvious that it does not, since purchasing a book grants ownership
of a copy of the book, as well as a limited license to the contents
within.
But courts have generally held that purchasers of software do
not own what they buy largely because the license simply asserts
that the buyer of software is not a buyer. Giving this much weight
to the seller’s characterization of ownership interests in software is,
in my mind, incorrect. The statute contemplates a norm by which
buyers would have an ownership interest in a given copy of software
39
(but obviously not ownership of the intellectual property itself).
Regarding the “essential step” defense, because the purchaser
is not the owner of a given copy but a “mere” licensee, she does not
benefit from the right to freely dispose of her copy of the software.
HOLDINGS, INC.: REMOTE-STORAGE DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDERS AND COPYRIGHT LAW
10 n.90 (2009), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs
/RL34719_090706.pdf (detailing that, in June 2009, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari for review of the apparent circuit split created by the Second Circuit’s
ruling and therefore suggesting that MAI and Cartoon Networks could be
harmonized).
37. See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 367, (E.D. Va. 1994) (“MAI customers are not ‘owners’ of the
copyrighted software; they possess only the limited rights set forth in their
licensing agreements.”); see also Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110–12 (establishing a three
point framework to determine if a purchaser of software is an owner or licensee).
The court looked to the license to determine if the license specified that the user
was a licensee or owner. It is therefore up to the seller to determine the property
rights of a buyer and not the underlying exchange. But see Vernor v. Autodesk,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170–72 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (determining the transfer
was a sale because of the underlying facts of the transaction and the terms in the
agreements).
38. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103,
1106–09 (2008) (outlining the dilemma of software transactions: whether they are
sales or licenses).
39. See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1343–44 (2001) (discussing the
DMCA and its overreach and arguing for an unlimited right to access digital
copies in one’s possession based on what the DMCA encroaches upon).
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Nor does she benefit from the “essential step” defense, which
would protect her from claims that I had made an illicit copy
merely by turning an electronic device on.
Following the RAM copy doctrine to its logical conclusions
leads the law to some strange distinctions. According to the RAM
copy doctrine, I have done nothing whatsoever to invoke copyright
when I page through a paperback in a bookstore. However, if I
page through the same book in the same store on a Kindle, I have
made a copy of the book (by turning the Kindle on) and am liable
for copyright infringement if I have done so in violation of any
term or condition attached to the e-Book. The RAM copy doctrine
40
has been widely criticized and superseded by statute in its narrow
holding (that a repair man cannot turn on a computer to service
41
it); but it remains the law of the land, at least in the Ninth Circuit.
Court decisions in this area have spurred verdant and
42
indignant legal literature in response. Although this literature
touches on the issues addressed here, I consider first sale and
essential step to be adequately theorized in the legal academic
literature, although perhaps misanalyzed by courts.
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anti-Circumvention
Right
Scholars also have debated the reach and role of the DMCA
and the damage that the Act has caused to bedrock fair use rights
(such as the right to reverse engineer, modify, or create add-on
projects) that have long been the foundation stones of the open

40. For critical treatment, see Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 1067, 1075–80 (2010) (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive
failings and policy considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine).
41. The RAM copy doctrine is superseded by the DMCA’s anti-circumvention
provisions. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) (2006).
42. See, e.g., Jonathan Band, A New Day for the DMCA: The Chamberlain and
Lexmark Decisions, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 987 (2004), available at
http://www.policybandwidth.com/publications/JBand-DMCABNA_v1.pdf
[hereinafter A New Day for the DMCA] (detailing two circuit court decisions,
Chamberlain v. Skylink and Lexmark v. Static Control Components); Carver, supra note
20, at 1894–95 (discussing problems with the MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc. decision); Ross Shikowitz, Note, License to Kill: MDY v. Blizzard
and the Battle over Copyright in World of Warcraft, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2010)
(arguing the district court decision in MDY Indust., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment,
Inc. was wrongly decided); Fred Von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Twelve
Years Under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 2010), http://
www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12-years.pdf (discussing how the
DMCA has been applied in various cases).
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internet architecture. 43 The dispute over the reach and role of the
44
DMCA is ground fairly well trodden. The Act has been accused of
killing free speech and lauded for providing the legal assurances
content owners needed to finally make their content available
online. The DMCA illegalizes both hacking into copyrighted
material and trafficking in tools that are primarily designed or
intended to hack into copyrighted material or trafficking in tools
45
that bypass copy protection of copyrighted material.
Specifically, copyright-holder-drafted EULAs and the DMCA
combine to grant greater rights than might be at first apparent.
The EULA is the door to the copyrighted material, and the DMCA
says that you must agree to the EULA or suffer legal sanction for
46
breaking down the door. Thus, for example, although the right
to reverse engineer code to make other interoperable code is a
longstanding fair use right and, indeed, the bedrock of the modern
47
internet, if an employee at a software development firm clicks “I
Agree” to an EULA that waives reverse engineering rights, the
48
whole firm’s ability to make interoperable software may evaporate.
43. See Amir Hassanabadi, Viacom v. Youtube: All Eyes Blind—The Limits of the
DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809194 (discussing the limitations of the DMCA and
concluding that the DMCA is no longer capable of protecting service providers
and content owners from copyright infringement suits); Lipton, supra note 20, at
522 (arguing that the DMCA may have overreached beyond the “digital copyright
piracy” it was meant to prevent and into other areas Congress did not foresee); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1)–(2) (2006) (explaining the limited purposes for which
reverse engineering is lawful); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1095, 1139 (2003) (“[T]he reverse engineering exception does not extend to
reverse engineering hardware or data. Neither does it allow reverse engineering
for any purpose other than software interoperability.”).
44. See, e.g., Carver, supra note 20; Hassanabadi, supra note 43; Lipton, supra
note 20.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) (2006).
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for discussion about EULAs as
both a contract and technological protection measure of copyrighted work. This
is the idea of the EULA as fitting under the DMCA because it is a technological
measure that is protected under 17 U.S.C. § 1201. “No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
47. This is necessarily so as the Internet is a decentralized network. In order
to communicate, and therefore create the Internet, different software and network
systems must be able to communicate and work together or be interoperable. See
New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing
network systems and the important role of interoperability when communicating
on networks as there is no one single type of computer, hardware, or code), aff’d,
373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use limitation on exclusive
rights); 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2010); see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent
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Of course, if the employee had reverse compiled the code and
avoided the EULA in order to preserve development rights, that
bypass would make the third-party developer liable under the
49
DMCA. This creates a relatively well-known DMCA catch-22: a
company that wishes to exercise its fair use rights to make an
interoperable product is damned if they click through the EULA
50
and damned if they do not.
3.

Contract Construction as a Limit on Copyright Control

Yet another approach focuses on the community-binding
contracts themselves and asks whether private law contracts are the
ideal vehicle for protecting public law concerns like fair use and
public access to information. This literature is the most undertheorized of the three and also the one to which I have contributed
51
somewhat and thus the one on which this article focuses. For
example, the MDY decisions have been parsed by other academics
52
on the prior two grounds: the reach and role of the DMCA and
53
But while
the questions of digital first sale and essential step.
there has been adequate discussion of the first sale and essential
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[W]e
advocate a limited right to reverse engineer patented computer programs in order
to gain access to and study those programs and to duplicate their unprotected
elements. Such a right is firmly established in copyright law, and seems
unexceptional as a policy matter even in patent law.”). But see MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a copy made
by a licensee is a violation of the license agreement and is also a copyright
infringement); supra text accompanying note 16. The employee who signs the
EULA binds the company to that contract and its terms, even if they specify a
waiver of the fair use exemption. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. The company would be liable as the EULA acts as a technological
measure and would have been circumvented. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A); see
also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
50. This is due to the license agreements widely in use. These agreements
often restrict fair use rights. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse
engineer software for interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I
Agree” on a Blizzard EULA); Von Lohmann, supra note 42, at 1 (“[T]he DMCA
grants to copyright owners the power to unilaterally eliminate the public’s fair use
rights.”).
51. See generally Fairfield, supra note 20 (discussing the limitations on contract
law in governing virtual worlds).
52. See, e.g., Jessica Gallegos, Note, A New Role for Tortious Interference in the
Digital Age: A Model to Enforce End User License Agreements, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411,
419–24 (2011) (discussing the MDY cases and their effect on the DMCA, tortious
interference, and EULAs).
53. See Hassanabadi, supra note 43; Lipton, supra note 20; see also supra note
41 and accompanying text.
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step implications of MDY, there has been much less and too little
discussion of the contractual interpretation element of the cases.
This is what I find fascinating about the MDY cases: the appellate
court’s interpretation of contractual conditions and covenants
overruled the district court’s conventional application of the first
sale, essential step, and RAM copy doctrines, as a matter of contract
interpretation. In so doing, the case directly undermines the trifecta
of legal errors that have plagued the private regulation of
54
Thus, this piece focuses on the Ninth
intellectual property.
Circuit’s under-examined contractual interpretation analysis.
4. Communications Decency Act Section 230 and the
Unenforceability of Consumer Protection Provisions by Consumers
There are two other subtexts in these cases. The first is that
although community-governing EULAs make many pretty promises
to consumers (for example, promises to parents about safety, to
online daters about the backgrounds of potential romantic
interests, or to online buyers about the risks of their online
transactions), those promises are largely unenforceable. This is
54. The Ninth Circuit previously held that a license agreement can control
the behavior of an end user. See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928
(9th Cir. 2010); supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing RAM copy
doctrine). The shift appears subtle in MDY but is significant. See MDY Indus., 629
F.3d. at 939 (setting out the contractual terms that limit the scope of a license as a
“condition” and all other license terms as “covenants”). The shift is that a court
reviewing contract terms in one case has the usual effect of a one-shot
engagement. The parties adapt and rewrite the contract but MDY is different.
The court states that not only is the license agreement written in a way that does
not impose copyright liability, as it is a covenant, but also that the interpretation of
the contractual terms is not a one-time assessment. Id. at 939–40 (“A . . . user
commits copyright infringement by playing [World of Warcraft] while violating a
ToU term that is a license condition. To establish copyright infringement . . . [the
plaintiff] must demonstrate that the violated term—ToU § 4(B)—is a condition
rather than a covenant. . . . Applying these principles, ToU . . . prohibitions . . . are
covenants rather than copyright-enforceable conditions.”) (citations omitted).
The court set out a new framework, based on two types of clauses that could not be
contracted around. The court’s framework of contractual conditions and
covenants directly undermines MAI and the RAM copy doctrine:
Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or any software copyright holder—
could designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright
infringement, by purporting to condition the license on the player’s
abstention from the disfavored conduct. The rationale would be that
because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the
software code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright
infringement. This would allow software copyright owners far greater
rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners.
Id. at 941.
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due to CDA § 230 55 that immunizes an interactive computing
services provider from claims arising out of the tortious acts of
users and immunizes the censorship attempts of corporate entities
by granting a near-absolute privilege to remove “objectionable
56
material.”
The result of combining these statutes with cleverly-worded
EULAs and TOUs is somewhat distressing. Online communities of
all sorts are governed by EULAs full of promises that users cannot
enforce against one another due to lack of privity and cannot
enforce against the service provider who is immunized under §
57
230. Thus, for example, when an online dating service provider
promised that all members of the service were over eighteen but
failed to ensure that this is so, the provider was not held liable for
its own breach of contract because the breach was caused by false
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
56. See id. § 230(c) (providing for protection of providers for screening of
offensive material, immunizing providers from liability where they do so). Section
230(c)(2)(A) specifically states that
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected . . . .
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
57. EULAs are by construction agreements between the company and the
user, not between users. For example, the concerns raised by MDY’s Glider
program that is the subject of MDY did not result in suits between users with the
program and those without. This is despite the claim by Blizzard that they
received 465,000 complaints about World of Warcraft bots from December 2004 to
March 2008. MDY, 629 F.3d at 936. Players did not sue each other; rather, the
company sued a third party, here MDY. See Fairfield, supra note 20, at 453
(detailing a case where users sued gold farmers within Blizzard’s World of
Warcraft game, asserting that all players are third-party beneficiaries of every other
player’s promise to Blizzard to refrain from engaging in the exchange of virtual
objects for real money). “Third-party-beneficiary clauses require that the
beneficiary be the intended, not just the incidental, beneficiary of a contractual
promise.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981)
(distinguishing “incidental” from “intended” beneficiaries of contract promises).
For § 230 treatment, see Fairfield, supra note 20, at 450 n.93:
Even if a virtual-world provider promises . . . to ban bad actors, those
promises may be held unenforceable under [§ 230 of the]
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)). This
statute has been broadly interpreted to hold internet service providers
immune to claims based on the actions of their users. See Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding internet
service providers broadly immune from claims based on bad acts of
users); . . . Doe v. Friend Finder Network, Inc. [540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.
N.H. 2008) (finding the same)].
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information (the age) entered by a third party (a minor) who
58
illicitly made use of the site. Similarly, consumers who have sued
dating sites based on other failures have been met with similar
59
For example, a consumer who is sexually
judicial opposition.
assaulted by someone she met through an online service would
have an extremely difficult time enforcing the service’s promise to
60
screen out users with violent histories.
All of this has an odd effect on the EULAs and TOUs that set
the rules for enormous (hundreds of millions strong) online
communities; these rules are used to attract consumers with the
promise of a safe space, but they are generally alterable at the nearwhim of the service provider and enforcement is absolutely a
matter of discretion. On a similar note, other courts have voiced
some distress that these EULAs and TOUs are not only
unenforceable by the consumers they purport to protect, but are
61
At least one
alterable at the near-whim of the license drafter.
court has noted that such a state of affairs approaches the
antiquated notion of “illusoriness”—the notion that a TOU that
reserves the untrammeled right to alter the terms without
62
consideration to the consumer constitutes no contract at all.
This forms an important subtext to the cases examined below.
While we look at the enforceability by a company of its TOU or
EULAs, it is critical to remember that these cases do not run both
ways. What is good for the goose is not good for the gander. The
promises made by consumers in EULAs and TOUs are often
63
enforced by courts; the promises made by corporations to
58. See, e.g., Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007)
(holding that CDA § 230 proscribes web provider SexSearch’s liability when a
female web user falsely put her age as eighteen on the website). But see Doe v.
SexSearch, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of counts for failure
to state a claim but declining to adopt the District Court’s holding that § 230
immunizes Internet computer services providers (ICSPs) from all state law claims).
59. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
MySpace not liable on CDA § 230 grounds for sexual assault of minor, Doe, by
someone she met via the service).
60. Id.
61. See Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
(holding that an arbitration clause was illusory because drafter could alter it at
will); see also Eric Goldman, Stop Saying “We Can Amend This Agreement Whenever We
Want”!—Harris v. Blockbuster, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 10, 2009, 10:26 AM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/stop_saying_we_1.htm
(criticizing the use of amendment clauses and highlighting the trouble it caused
Blockbuster).
62. See Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99.
63. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
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consumers (for example, promises to parents about safety or
representations to an online dater about the arrest record of her
64
next date) are not.
5.

Overtones of Anticompetition

There are also strong overtones of anticompetition and
antitrust inherent in deciding what promises content holders
should be able to extract from consumers through the catch-22
that the courts have handed to corporations. Of course, the very
first promises extracted through EULAs are anticompetitive ones,
such as promises not to do business with a competitor in a product
65
aftermarket. Courts have traditionally asked when a company may
66
use its control over content to destroy competition but have used
67
this power much less in the information marketplace. The idea is
that the very speed of innovation in the software industry
68
supposedly obviates the need for traditional antitrust remedies.
the software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse engineer software for
interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I Agree” on a Blizzard
EULA).
64. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)
(describing that the contract at issue was not a battle-of-the-forms scenario and
instead there was one contract, which under U.C.C. § 2-204 allowed the vendor, as
master of the offer, to set the terms of acceptance). The contract then cuts one
way—against the buyer.
65. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–32 (2006)
(discussing the use of a license dealing with printing technology between
companies). “The OEMs agree that they will purchase their ink exclusively from
petitioners, and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented
containers with ink of any kind.” Id. at 32; United States v. Microsoft Corp.
(Microsoft I), 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll the OEM license restrictions
at issue represent uses of Microsoft’s market power to protect its monopoly,
unredeemed by any legitimate justification.”); see also MDY Indus. v. Blizzard
Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) (detailing the Blizzard TOU and its
prohibition on the use of third-party software).
66. See Stuart M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries and Intellectual Property in the New Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 1, 2 (2002) (“Traditional rules of antitrust apply even in highly regulated
industries, such as the power industry.”).
67. See Peter Dizikes, Justice Dept. Drops Microsoft Breakup Request, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 6, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87749&page=1
(“Rather than break up the company into separate operating systems and
applications businesses, the Justice Department said the government will pursue
restrictions on Microsoft’s business practices to ‘obtain prompt, effective and
certain relief’ for consumers.”).
68. See Microsoft I, 253 F.3d at 65 (“As with the license restrictions, we consider
first whether the suspect actions had an anticompetitive effect, and then whether
[there is] a procompetitive justification for them.”); see also LIEBOWITZ &
MARGOLIS, supra note 28, at 246, 256.
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Thus the first cases challenging a manufacturer’s right to control
aftermarkets were direct antitrust claims, such as claims by a
company against a competitor that the competitor accessed the
plaintiff’s content in violation of intellectual property law as a
69
means of blocking competing products. But due to the muted
reception of anticompetition claims in information technology
cases, the current set of attacks on aftermarkets are now being
litigated more as subtext to the contractual interpretation,
copyright scope, and DMCA reach and role arguments.
B. The Emerging Case Law
This section discusses the circuit split currently underway
between the Federal, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with respect to
whether a copyright holder may require any behavior she likes of
70
her users as a condition of an intellectual property license. The
69. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 446 (2007)
(“Microsoft further acknowledged that by licensing copies of Windows to
manufacturers of computers sold in the United States, it induced infringement of
AT & T’s patent.”) (footnote omitted).
70. The circuit split is comprised of three approaches as to whether violations
of a license agreement can result in copyright infringement. The Federal Circuit
Court’s view in Chamberlain is essentially the same as the Sixth Circuit Court’s view
in Lexmark. The Ninth Circuit issued two different approaches, first with MAI and,
second, in the recent MDY decision. Compare Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that the DMCA’s
anti-circumvention provisions do not give a new anti-circumvention right and
rather give a cause of action for rights provided under preexisting copyright
protection), and Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA create a new cause of action for copyrights already in place and that
circumvention is not infringement), with MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining that an action of an end user was both
a violation of a license agreement and a copyright infringement), and MDY Indus.,
629 F.3d at 941 (rejecting the RAM copy doctrine and interpreting the license
agreement to contain covenants rather than conditions and that the license
agreement in dispute not only did not reach copyright infringement but also that
later license agreements would be so affected). The effect of the Federal Circuit’s
ruling is that a violation of a license agreement will not be treated as copyright
infringement unless that violation is also a right protected under copyright. The
court in Lexmark stated the following:
All three liability provisions of this section of the DMCA require the
claimant to show that the ‘technological measure’ at issue ‘controls
access to a work protected under this title,’ see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)–
(C), which is to say a work protected under the general copyright statute,
id. § 102(a). To the extent the Toner Loading Program is not a “‘work
protected under [the copyright statute]’… the DMCA necessarily would
not protect it.
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550. The Ninth Circuit’s finding in MAI is based on the RAM
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legal questions of MDY, and thus the ones to keep in mind, are first
whether a copyright holder may require its consumers to stop
doing business with a competitor after the competitor markets a
competing aftermarket program and second, more strongly,
whether the copyright holder can place license conditions
requiring users to vote Democratic or wear pink (or not to be rude
or not to criticize the company, which are real-world EULA or TOU
conditions) on pain of infringement of intellectual property
71
rights.
The MDY court likewise sought to ascertain when a company
may forbid its customers from doing business with other companies
72
(A thought
as a condition of an intellectual property license.
experiment: imagine if the same intellectual property claims now
being raised by content providers had been asserted by the
developers of TCP/IP—the basic transmission packet routing
protocol that runs the Internet—where the use of others’ servers
and other computing resources is essentially ubiquitous.) These
issues have currently developed into a good old-fashioned circuit
split in the appellate courts, as the next sections describe.
A few caveats seem appropriate at this point. I describe here a
line of cases that tend to limit the ability of manufacturers qua
intellectual property holders to control the non-intellectualproperty related actions of their customers. I do this with full
awareness that the cases I describe below focus on limiting the
scope of the DMCA in order to achieve these limits, while MDY
does so via contractual construction of the clauses of the EULA
(that is the point of the article). I also do so knowing that there are
other cases, for example, those rooted in Universal Studios v.
Reimerdes, that cut the other way by holding that the DMCA ushered
in a new legal era in which copyright holders may demand nearly
73
anything of consumers on pain of copyright infringement.
copy doctrine. The RAM copy doctrine makes it a copyright violation to violate
any term of a license agreement where the software is copied into the computer’s
RAM. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71. These conditions are similar to the provision in Blizzard’s EULA and
TOU preventing cheating. None of these hypothetical conditions or the real
world example of the prohibited use of “bots” have a direct relationship with
copyright protections. The court in MDY rejected this idea. See MDY Indus., 629
F.3d at 941. The new ruling went against the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision
supporting this EULA Copyright control. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 511.
72. This is exactly what Blizzard attempted to do. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at
939 (laying out a framework for copyright and contractual terms for licenses which
turn on whether the terms of the license affect the scope of the license).
73. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
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My goal is straightforward. I identify a growing trend in which
some courts limit contractual controls exercised by intellectual
property holders over consumers, and then observe a recent and
important precedent in a critical circuit (the MDY line of cases in
the Ninth Circuit) that actually strengthens that trend, rather than
undermines it.
1.

Chamberlain v. Skylink
74

In Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies, the Federal
Circuit decided whether a company might leverage control over
intellectual property embedded in a garage door. In Chamberlain,
the intellectual property at issue was a computer authentication
program embedded in the door which was used to exclude
75
competitors from selling generic garage door openers. The
garage doors worked by responding to a rolling authentication
code—it changed regularly, ostensibly to prevent someone with
another garage door opener from breaking into the house but in
actuality to prevent competitors from making garage door openers
76
that would interoperate with the garage door. The defendant did
precisely that anyway by offering a generic garage door opener that
77
was able to circumvent Chamberlain’s authentication sequence.
Chamberlain sued, and the district court held for Skylink,
noting that because Chamberlain did not condition its sale to users
78
on not using generic remote controls, the sale was unconditional
and users did not commit any copyright infringement when they
79
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding
used a generic remote.
that Chamberlain had not met its burden of showing that the
access by Chamberlain users using generic garage door openers was
unauthorized, and thus that there was no circumvention of access
80
controls such that a DMCA claim could be sustained.
The more important part of the court’s analysis bore on the
requirement that there be a nexus between the exercise of the
exclusionary right of the DMCA and some right granted by the

(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
74. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1183.
76. Id. at 1183–85.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1187.
79. Id. at 1187–88.
80. Id. at 1202–03.
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Copyright Act. 81 The court noted the following:
Chamberlain, however, has failed to show not only the
requisite lack of authorization, but also the necessary fifth
element of its claim, the critical nexus between access and
protection.
Chamberlain neither alleged copyright
infringement nor explained how the access provided by the
Model 39 transmitter facilitates the infringement of any right that
the Copyright Act protects. There can therefore be no
reasonable relationship between the access that
homeowners gain to Chamberlain’s copyrighted software
when using Skylink’s Model 39 transmitter and the
protections that the Copyright Act grants to
82
Chamberlain.
Both the district and appellate courts held that there was no
underlying copyright violation when Chamberlain’s customers used
83
a generic remote. Thus, the requisite nexus between a copyright
violation and the protections granted by the DMCA’s anticircumvention right simply did not exist. As a result, neither the
purchaser nor the manufacturer of the generic garage door remote
were liable for copyright infringement or a DMCA violation. The
following discussion may clarify how near a miss the entire generic
aftermarket add-on industry had.
2.

Lexmark v. Static Control Components
84

In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit implicitly required a nexus between the
technological access control protected by the DMCA—the lock—
85
and some right protected under the Copyright Act. Lexmark sold
86
printers and printer cartridges. Lexmark marketed “single-use”
non-refillable printer cartridges; these cartridges were sold at a
discount up front but could not be refilled because of a computer
control that caused the printer to reject refilled single-use
87
cartridges. Static Control Components marketed a program that
permitted Lexmark buyers to bypass the single-use control and thus
88
refill and reuse single use cartridges.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id.
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 549–50.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 529–31.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12

66

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

The Sixth Circuit engaged in a somewhat more circuitous
analysis than did the Chamberlain court, but came to the same
89
result. The district court first noted that the copyrighted material
claimed—the authentication sequence that caused the printer to
accept or reject the cartridge—was the same as the access control
that Lexmark argued Static Control Components had
90
circumvented in violation of the DMCA. The Lexmark court
decided that the access control and the copyrighted material
91
protected by the access control could not be the same material.
The Lexmark court also determined that the numeric sequence
necessary to authenticate the cartridges by the printer was the only
way to so authenticate and thus that the mathematical sequence’s
92
function “merged” with the copyrightable elements. As a result,
the copyrightable elements’ functional components were not
protected and due to the merger, neither was the numerical
93
sequence protected by copyright.
A second critical finding by the Lexmark court was that the
authentication sequence did not provide “access” to any
94
copyrighted material. Rather, the purchase of the printer and
95
In that respect, the software
cartridge provided “access.”
handshake protocol that controlled cartridge use was not deemed
to qualify as a technological protection measure protected under
the DMCA at all.
The Lexmark court in the end made a move similar to that of
the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain. The court required that the
DMCA “lock” first “provide[] access” to copyrighted material.
Secondly, and most importantly, the court then required that the
action performed with the copyrighted material must have some
relationship to the right protected under the Copyright Act—either
a right of copying, distributing, performing, creating derivative
96
work, or so on. Because the court found that the “lock” protected
no right of the software creator under the Copyright Act, the court
89. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
90. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
91. Id. at 546, 547, 550.
92. Id. at 535–36.
93. Id. at 535–44.
94. Id. at 546 (“It is not Lexmark’s authentication sequence that ‘controls
access’ to the Printer Engine Program. . . . It is the purchase of a Lexmark printer
that allows ‘access’ to the program.”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 549–50; see Chamberlain Grp, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d
1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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determined that Static Control Components’ circumvention of the
97
printer authentication sequence was not a violation of the DMCA.
3.

MGE UPS Systems v. GE Consumer & Industrial

The Fifth Circuit, in MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer &
98
Industrial, Inc., acted more recently to limit the scope of
contractual control that intellectual property holders can assert
99
The MGE court rejected a DMCA claim
over their customers.
asserted by a manufacturer of an encrypted security dongle—
generally a USB stick used to generate a rolling authentication
code just like that used in the garage door in Chamberlain—only this
100
time the dongle granted access to the consumer’s own computer.
MGE UPS manufactured a dongle that controlled access to
101
Hackers then
diagnostic programs in the hardware that it sold.
102
posted the circumvention code on the Internet. A GE employee
used the hacked software, and MGE UPS sued—and lost—on the
103
The court limited the dongle creator’s ability to
DMCA claim.
control a customer’s access to the customer’s own computer system
by narrowing the definition of circumvention:
The DMCA defines circumvention broadly to include not
only disabling protections, but also avoiding or bypassing
them. . . . We, however, do not construe “bypass” or
“avoid” to encompass use of a copyrighted work
subsequent to a circumvention merely because that use
would have been subject to a technological measure that
would have controlled access to the work, but for that
circumvention. So broad a construction would extend the
DMCA beyond its intended purposes to reach extensive
97. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 563–64.
98. 622 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2010) (determining that MGE had not shown
circumvention of its software protections).
99. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 612 F.3d 760, 765
(5th Cir. 2010) (embracing the Federal Circuit’s approach in Chamberlain
requiring an infringement nexus), withdrawn, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010). The
court avoided adding to the circuit split by not citing Chamberlain but still added to
the split by finding that once a measure is circumvented, subsequent use does not
constitute a per se violation of the DMCA. MGE, 622 F.3d at 366.
100. MGE, 622 F.3d at 364, 366; see also Tim Armstrong, DMCA: Fifth Circuit
Inches Closer to “Fair Circumvention” Defense, INFO/LAW (July 26, 2010),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2010/07/26/dmca-fifth-circuit-inchescloser-to-fair-circumvention-defense/ [hereinafter DMCA Fair Defense] (praising
the outcome of the decision but criticizing the court’s cursory analysis).
101. MGE, 622 F.3d at 364.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 366.
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conduct already well-regulated by existing copyright
104
laws. MGE did not present any evidence showing that a
GE/PMI representative altered the Pacret and Muguet
software such that a dongle was not required to use the
software; rather, employees simply used the software after
the alteration was made. As such, the actions by GE/PMI
employees did not amount to circumvention. Without
proving GE/PMI actually circumvented the technology,
105
MGE does not present a valid DMCA claim.
This holding is potentially broader than the others, since it restricts
the ability of an intellectual property holder to control its
customers’ aftermarket modifications on the grounds that once a
technological measure has been bypassed (or “cracked”),
subsequent uses of the cracked software do not constitute per se
106
And since GE did not crack the
violations of the DMCA.
software, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, GE was not liable under the
107
DMCA.
The outcomes of the Chamberlain and Lexmark cases seem fairly
balanced from a doctrinal and normative standpoint. MGE UPS
joins the trend against intellectual property control of customers
and perhaps extends too far by restricting the statutory power of
intellectual property holders in DMCA cases to situations in which
the customer herself cracked the software. The manufacture of
generic television remote controls and garage door openers seems
fairly uncontroversial. The outright circumvention of security
dongles adds to this trend but is, to my mind, more controversial.
Underscoring these courts’ decisions was the fact that each
plaintiff intellectual property holder attempted to control the
104. Id. The Fifth Circuit’s language is not far removed from that of the Ninth
Circuit’s in MDY finding that such a construction of the DMCA would go beyond
congressional intent and precedent. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d
928, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2010).
105. MGE, 622 F.3d at 366.
106. Compare Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a reasonable relationship between the
circumvention and a protected interest under the Copyright Act of the copyright
owner), and Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
550 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring that technological measures must control access to
a work falling under general copyright protection), with MGE, 622 F.3d at 366
(finding that subsequent use of a circumvented copyrighted work did not
constitute a per se copyright infringement), and MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941
(finding that the Blizzard license agreement contained conditions and covenants,
and determining that whether violations would constitute copyright infringement
hinged on whether a condition or covenant was violated, and not an infringement
nexus).
107. MGE, 622 F.3d at 366.
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businesses that customers could economically interact with—or the
after-market modifications that customers could make to the
customers’ own property—merely by claiming that the EULAs
prohibited customers from purchasing aftermarket add-ons and
108
services or making aftermarket modifications. From a common
sense perspective, these decisions check out. Just as a car
manufacturer cannot prevent customers from purchasing gold rims
or a house seller cannot prevent a buyer from remodeling, courts
have quite sensibly and increasingly held that an attempt by an
intellectual property holder to seize the aftermarket for
modifications and aftermarket goods was bad for consumers and
competition alike.
Unfortunately, the DMCA made simple cases needlessly
complex. Each court had to do some heavy lifting to determine
that a manufacturer was not privileged to control the add-on or
aftermarket modification purely by virtue of the fact that they
claimed a copyright interest in software embedded in the objects
they sold to the users.
Each of these court cases represents a slightly different
approach toward the same goal. Each court attempted to whittle
down the seemingly unlimited copyright and DMCA anticircumvention rights and did so by requiring limits on the
application of the DMCA, either to violations actionable under the
Copyright Act itself or to direct circumventions by the defendant.
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow this DMCA-centered
109
approach in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,
and instead focused on the terms of the contract granting the
110
Yet the case is not beyond hope. Properly
license itself.
understood, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is even broader than any
of the prior cases in this trend, since it held that a copyright
holder’s customers simply did not violate copyright even though
111
they breached the express terms of their license agreements. The
108. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530, 531 (restricting the use of non-Lexmark
toner cartridges); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183, 1187 (prohibiting the use of nonChamberlain garage remotes); see also MGE, 622 F.3d at 366–67 (discussing
assessment of damages for copyright infringement and looking to a hypothetical
license agreement and what the parties would have agreed to); Band, supra note
42, at 988 (“And consumers noted with alarm two instances where companies used
the DMCA to threaten competitors in after-markets . . . .”).
109. 629 F.3d at 928.
110. Id. at 939–41, 952.
111. Id. at 941 (“Although . . . conduct may violate the contractual covenants . .
. it would not violate any . . . exclusive rights of copyright. . . . A . . . user violates
the covenants . . . but does not thereby commit copyright infringement because
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next part of this article therefore focuses on the close contract
interpretation approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in MDY.
III. NEXUS CRYSTALS: CRYSTALLIZING LIMITS ON CONTRACTUAL
CONTROLS
The district court in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard
112
Entertainment, Inc., offered a fairly black-letter interpretation of
the current state of the law, given the Ninth Circuit’s then-extant
judicial interpretations, by rejecting World of Warcraft (WoW)
players’ claims of ownership and thus their access to the essential
113
The district court then held that players violated
step defense.
intellectual property rights each time they turned the game on
whilst using third-party software that altered the game
114
experience. The district court thus permitted a software provider
to limit what aftermarket purchases or modifications a customer
could make.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in broad
115
measure, and it is precisely the tension between the Ninth
Circuit’s newfound understanding that software holders cannot be
permitted to enforce any term whatsoever as a condition of an
intellectual property license and its persistent refusal to adopt a
“nexus test” for the DMCA claims that make the MDY line of cases
116
so interesting. As the following analysis shows, the Ninth Circuit
clearly has adopted as a matter of contract construction what it
117
rejected as a matter of statutory interpretation: companies cannot
[he or she] does not infringe any . . . exclusive rights.”).
112. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. (MDY District I), No. CV-062555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008)
(finding MDY in breach of the DMCA).
113. Id. at *17–18, *52 (“[Granting] summary judgment in favor of Blizzard
with respect to MDY’s liability for tortious interference . . . and contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement . . . grant[ing] summary judgment in favor of
MDY on the portion of the DMCA claim . . . that is based on 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(2) and applies to Blizzard’s game client software code; grant[ing]
summary judgment in favor of MDY on the unfair competition claim . . . and
den[ying] summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim . . . .”) (internal
citations omitted); see also MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. (MDY District II),
616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Ariz. 2009) (outlining the court’s order and the
injunction granted following trial on the remaining claims).
114. MDY District II, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 965–68.
115. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941–42.
116. Id. at 939–40, 950, 952.
117. Compare id. at 939–41 (outlining the difference between covenants and
conditions in a license agreement and holding that terms in a license agreement
unrelated to a protected right under the Copyright Act cannot be enforced under
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require customers to act in certain social ways that have little to do
118
The following
with acts proscribed under the Copyright Act.
subparts discuss some facts behind the case, the decisions below,
and the appellate ruling in detail.
A. MDY v. Blizzard Entertainment
This section examines both the factual backdrop of the
MDY/Blizzard dispute (some of which was incorrectly stated at oral
119
as well as the district court and Ninth Circuit
argument),
opinions. The section concludes with an analysis of the contractual
interpretation holdings of the Ninth Circuit, which represent to me
a significant and very important narrowing of the potential for
consumer liability for copyright infringement (and, indirectly, for
secondary liability for the third-party developers who serve them).
1.

The Players and Some Additional Interesting Facts

MDY was a fight between gaming juggernaut Blizzard
120
Entertainment and MDY, a one-man add-on software business.
Blizzard is the creator of video game mega-hits that include Diablo
I and II, Starcraft, Starcraft II, Warcraft I-III, the upcoming muchanticipated Diablo III, and the fantastically popular massively
multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) at issue in the
121
MDY case, World of Warcraft (WoW). WoW is a virtual world—a
simulated three-dimensional, persistent, and interactive space in
which players are represented by avatars (digital representations of

Copyright law), with id. at 942–48 (interpreting the anti-circumvention statutory
regime and finding a new right of access, yielding copyright protection, created
under § 1201(a)).
118. See id. at 941 (“A player might violate this prohibition . . . by harassing
another player with unsolicited instant messages. Although this conduct may
violate the contractual covenants with Blizzard, it would not violate any of
Blizzard’s exclusive rights of copyright.”).
119. Counsel for Blizzard argued that Blizzard never permitted programs such
as Glider. Blizzard had, in fact, allowed other third-party programs or “bots.” See
World of Warcraft Database, infra note 133.
120. Blizzard is well-known for enforcing its intellectual property rights in the
video game context. Recent legal battles include the suits of a rival game server,
WoWscape, Peons4hire (a spamming entity), KeSpa, and MBC Games over the
emergence of StarCraft as a lucrative sport, to name but a few.
121. See Games, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/games/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2011); see also Matt Vella, Inside the World of Blizzard, BUSINESSWEEK,
Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/aug2008
/id20080820_123140.htm (detailing the success of Blizzard).
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themselves within the virtual world). 122 Blizzard boasts of more
than 12 million subscribers to the game, each of whom pays a
monthly subscription fee, and the game brings in over a billion
123
dollars annually in revenue.
At the center of this case was Blizzard’s add-on policy. From
the game’s inception, Blizzard harnessed player creativity by
encouraging third parties to create add-ons that improved the
game experience. However, add-on creators live in a legal grey
space. Blizzard reserved, and reserves, the right, via its EULA, to
decide at any time that an add-on developer’s creation does not
meet the standards of game play or that a third-party program
124
On more than one
offers some players a unique advantage.
occasion, Blizzard has even adopted the add-on’s functionality into
its own interface and then banned or de-incentivized the use of the
125
competing add-on.
MDY developed a third-party add-on for WoW. In March 2005,
Michael Donnelly (the founder, owner, and head of MDY) created
126
a popular program called Glider (sometimes WoW-Glider), that
127
permitted users to automate their avatars. It is important to note
that many virtual worlds have expressly permitted—indeed almost
required—automated scripting activity on the part of the player. A
good example of this was the (at first) popular Star Wars Galaxies
122. BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 2–10 (2008) (describing what a virtual world is and
what an avatar is); see also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A
Primer, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 13, 15 (Jack M.
Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (describing persistent worlds as those
where “the environment continues to exist and changes over time” despite a given
player logging off).
123. See Press Release, Blizzard Entm’t, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base
Reaches 12 Million Worldwide (Oct. 7, 2010), http://us.blizzard.com/enus/company/press/pressreleases.html?id=2847881; see also Activision Blizzard
Announces Record First Quarter Financial Results, ACTIVISION (May 9, 2011),
http://investor.activision.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=575495.
124. See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://
us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2010).
125. See Ndragheta, Blizzard Continues to Steal Ideas, WOWHEAD (June 18, 2009,
4:22 PM), http://www.wowhead.com/forums&topic=103216/blizzard-continuesto-steal-ideas. For a list of these third party add-ons, see World of Warcraft Client
Patch 4.2: Rage of the Firelands, WORLD OF WARCRAFT: CATACLYSM (June 28, 2011),
http://us.battle.net/wow/en/game/patch-notes/4-2-0 [hereinafter Rage of the
Firelands].
126. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).
127. Id. at 935–36 (explaining that the program was initially created by
Michael Donnelly for his personal use and then later sold to other users given its
wild success).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/12

30

Fairfield: Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Vi

2011]

NEXUS CRYSTALS

73

virtual world, in which players were permitted to write elaborate
128
automated scripts that would automate the player’s avatar.
Glider permitted similar functionality. Players could instruct
their avatars to engage in simple, repetitive tasks (like killing the
same virtual creature over and over again in search of a rare
129
Glider did not permit players to engage in the more
item).
complex behavior required to actually play the game interactively,
such as cooperating with other players to go on an adventure
130
The
(called a “raid”). This was far beyond Glider’s capacity.
Glider software was of a genre called “botting,” since it turned the
player’s avatar into a “bot” (short for robot) that acted
131
automatically within the game context.
Consistent with the then-prevalent industry practice, Blizzard’s
132
EULA did not at first ban avatar automation scripts outright. The
line between bots and legitimate add-ons was, and is, impossible to
seriously maintain. All add-on computer scripts automate some
element of the functionality of an avatar. For example, an early
and extraordinarily successful add-on was called “Thottbot”—the
name of which even included “bot”—which automated the
collection and collation of all objects, creatures, and quests within
133
the WoW world. Thottbot then automatically indexed and made
searchable the quests, items, and creatures in the game. Thus, a
player who got stuck on a quest or could not find a given creature
or item could simply look up the answer with Thottbot. Even
though Thottbot was, and still remains, a powerful way to

128. See Kurt D. Squire & Constance A. Steinkuehler, Generating Cyber Culture/s:
The Case of Star Wars Galaxies, in CYBERLINES 2.0: LANGUAGES AND CULTURES OF THE
INTERNET 177, 181–83 (Donna Gibbs & Kerri-Lee Krause eds., 2d ed. 2008),
available at http://inkido.indiana.edu/onlinecom/squire-steinkuehler.pdf.
129. See MICHAEL LUMMIS & ED KERN, WORLD OF WARCRAFT MASTER GUIDE
STRATEGY GUIDE 4 (2d ed. 2006); Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1026 (“Once the
player instructs Glider, the program works automatically, allowing the player to
return to his computer later and resume playing with the added experience and
valuable items Glider earned in the meantime.”).
130. Indeed, a primary purpose of the program was to automate simple tasks
to speed up game play. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 935–36. This is seen in what it
did: automate simple tasks and leave complex enjoyable tasks, such as raids, to the
user.
131. Id. at 935.
132. Id. at 936, 956.
133. Indeed, Thottbot is still up and running, although its importance has
been eclipsed by competitors. See, e.g., World of Warcraft Database, THOTTBOT,
http://thottbot.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). For additional amusement, one
might search on Thottbot for the description of a Nexus Crystal, a once-important
virtual object in the WoW economy.
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circumvent the “natural” progression of exploring the game, it
remains a tolerated and successful add-on—indeed, a pillar of the
134
community —although now somewhat diminished in importance
since other, more aggressive indexing sites have become
135
This norm remains firm throughout other popular
available.
virtual worlds. For example, in addition to the Star Wars Galaxies
scripts described above, a core component of the popular virtual
world Second Life is the so-called “Animation Override”—a process
by which an avatar is automated by a third-party script and
performs some act (usually a dance) under the control of the
136
computer.
Although critical to a proper understanding of the case, these
background facts were under-addressed or outright misstated at
oral argument. For example, in oral argument before the Ninth
Circuit, counsel for Blizzard incorrectly represented that Blizzard
had, prior to the launching of Gilder, banned datamining and bot
137
One must assume that Blizzard’s
algorithms under the EULA.
counsel was simply unaware of Thottbot and the hundreds of other
botting, automation, and datamining scripts that ran, and continue
138
to run, openly and with Blizzard’s blessing within WoW.
As might be predicted, MDY’s Glider program proved
139
extremely popular and sold over 100,000 copies. Blizzard then
140
Blizzard’s
altered its EULA to ban avatar-automation software.
134. See Thottbot.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo
/thottbot.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (detailing the web traffic of Thottbot,
showing that, as of November 24, 2011, it was ranked number 46,771 in the world
and number 15,381 in the United States); see also Simon Carless, IGE: Inside the
MMO Trading Machine, GAMASUTRA (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.gamasutra
.com/view/feature/1837/ige_inside_the_mmo_trading_machine.php
(labeling
Thottbot as a “major item listing site”).
135. See Wowhead.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo
/wowhead.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (listing Wowhead, a comparable
program to Thottbot, with a traffic rank of 1391 globally and 949 in the United
States, as of November 24, 2011).
136. See SLTutorials.net Tutorial Database, SLTUTORIALS, http://www.sltutorials
.net/mtree/Animation_%26_More/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
137. Oral Argument at 18:48, MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d
928 (No. 09-15932), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media
/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000005584 (stating that the Terms of Use in use at the
time of Glider’s development contained a provision that banned “mining data
from the game”).
138. See Ndragheta, supra note 125; Rage of the Firelands, supra note 125 (listing
these third-party add-ons).
139. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 936.
140. Id. at 956 n.22 (“When MDY created Glider in 2005, Blizzard’s ToU
prohibited the use of ‘cheats’ and ‘unauthorized third-party software’ in
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position was that avatar automation reduced the player’s incentive
to play the game as intended and reduced the social interactivity
141
important to the game. (Never mind that Blizzard’s position was
incoherent, given its ongoing tolerance of “walk-through” and
142
“cheat” tip sites for WoW.) MDY believed that Blizzard did not
have the right to unilaterally alter its EULA to destroy MDY’s
business model. MDY therefore altered Glider to be undetectable
143
by Blizzard’s sentinel program, Warden.
The Warden program was the technological enforcement arm
of Blizzard’s interpretation of its EULA. Warden was downloaded
onto players’ computers and then scanned their RAM for the
presence of other programs that interacted with the WoW
144
It is important to note that Warden was not copy
executable.
protection software in any but the most technical of aspects.
Warden reported its findings to Blizzard, permitting Blizzard to
145
ban users of forbidden third-party software from the game.
Warden also prevented the WoW executable from running if it
found the presence of banned third-party executable programs in
RAM. Warden was not, however, in any other way a copy
protection program.
MDY modified its program to avoid detection by Warden and
further warned its users via its website that use of Glider was a
breach of the WoW EULA and thus might result in banning.
However, MDY continued to offer Glider and to update and
modify it so that it would evade detection by Warden.
2.

The District Court Opinions

The district court opinion (actually consisting of two opinions
worth mentioning, one granting early summary judgment on some
claims, and the second following trial on the remaining claims) was
a clear and straightforward black-letter application of Ninth Circuit
case law interpreting the Copyright Act, first sale doctrine, essential
connection with WoW. The meaning of these contractual terms, including
whether they prohibit bots such as Glider, is ambiguous.”). MDY argued that
Blizzard changed its TOU to ban bots directly, but this was not decided given the
triable issue of fact. Id. at 956 n.24.
141. See id. at 936, 956.
142. See, e.g., Ndragheta, supra note 125; (a message board providing walkthrough and cheat information to the public); see also Rage of the Firelands, supra
note 125 (listing third party add-ons).
143. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 936.
144. See id. at 942.
145. Id. at 936, 942.
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step defense, and the DMCA. The court held that following MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., the license clearly considered
the anti-botting rule as a condition on which the grant of license
146
Thus, the district court held, WoW players did not
was based.
own their copies of the game, were not entitled to load the software
into RAM as an “essential step” of making use of it, and therefore
committed primary copyright infringement each time that they
147
loaded the game in contravention of the terms of the license.
Having found primary copyright infringement, the court then
easily found that MDY had committed secondary copyright
infringement under both vicarious and contributory liability
148
Furthermore, the district court granted summary
theories.
judgment on Blizzard’s state law claim of tortious interference with
contract, on the grounds that under Arizona law MDY’s conduct in
offering and continuing to offer Glider was wrongful as a matter of
149
law.
The district court held for MDY on Blizzard’s DMCA §
1201(a)(2) claim as premised on alleged circumvention of access
150
The district court did
controls protecting a copyrighted work.
find that MDY violated § 1201(a)(2) with respect to the dynamic
151
The district court reasoned that
nonliteral elements of WoW.
since players had paid for access to WoW and were in fact able to
access WoW, the Warden program did not control access to
152
WoW.
The district court did however deviate from its by-the-book
black-letter approach to note that there may be a category of
contractual clauses that are simply outside of the ambit of
153
In its
conditions imposed within intellectual property licenses.
earlier opinion granting Blizzard summary judgment on secondary
copyright liability (among other claims), the district court noted a
difference between clauses that go to a right of copy and those that
are merely related to proper gameplay:
The provisions of section 4 thus make clear that although
users are licensed to play WoW and to use the game client
146. MDY District I, No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at
*10–11, *16–19 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
147. Id. at *31, *32.
148. See id. at *32.
149. Id. at *51.
150. MDY District II, 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, at 964–68 (D. Ariz. 2009).
151. Id. at 966–67.
152. See id.
153. See MDY District I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *12.
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software while playing, they are not licensed to exercise
other rights belonging exclusively to Blizzard as the
copyright holder . . . . Section 5 of the TOU is different.
It is titled “Rules of Conduct.” Id. at 4. The subsections of
section 5 are titled “Rules Related to Usernames and
Guild Designations” (§ 5(A)), “Rules Related to ‘Chat’
and Interaction With Other Users” (§ 5(B)), and “Rules
154
Related to Game Play” (§ 5(C)).
As a result, the district court determined that:
Section 5 thus sets rules for the game, whereas section 4
establishes limits more clearly designed to preserve
Blizzard’s copyright interests. The section 5 rules also
regulate relatively minor matters such as the use of
celebrity names (§ 5(A)(4)) or offensive language (§
5(A)(2)) for WoW characters. Section 5 establishes game
155
rules by contract.
Thus, even though the district court held that the “no-botting” rule
was a condition of an intellectual property license rather than a
contractual condition, the court seemed unsettled by the
156
The claim that any
overreaching claims by copyright holders.
activity performed during the use of software could be subject to a
condition of a grant of an intellectual property license seemed even
to the district court to be one step too far. The district court noted
this distinction quite clearly:
When the EULA and TOU are considered in their
entirety, the Court concludes that section 4 of the TOU
establishes limitations on the scope of the license and
section 5 sets rules of the game as independent contract
terms [that is, contractual covenants instead of intellectual
157
property conditions].
Despite its reservations, however, the district court held that WoW
buyers did not own the software that they bought, that they had no
right to load the software into RAM unless they complied with every
condition in the EULA, and that MDY was secondarily liable for any
copyright infringement that was the result of players playing the
158
game while using Glider.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at *17–18.
Id. at *18.
See id. at *20.
Id. at *18.
See id. at *18, *31–32, *52.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Appeal
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, it did so
by adopting and extending the district court's logic regarding the
enforceability of social control clauses like "do not use third party
programs." That is, the Ninth Circuit simply seized on the
difference identified by the district court between limits on rights
exercised vis-à-vis intellectual property (the right to make a copy, to
distribute, to create derivative works, and so on) and purely “social”
159
contractual clauses that merely set forth contractual game rules.
The Ninth Circuit then expanded on the district court’s own
reasoning to such an extent that it overruled the district court’s
overall outcome.
1.

Conditions, Covenants, and Copyrights

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit broadly reversed. First, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding any copyright
infringement whatsoever, whether primary (by the player) or
secondary (on MDY). The critical question was whether Blizzard
players, when they used WoW Glider, were directly violating
intellectual property rights instead of merely violating a contractual
covenant set forth in the EULA. (The court used a basic naming
convention: it termed clauses that limit the scope of an intellectual
property license “conditions” and other contractual promises
160
“covenants.”) The court determined, quite correctly, that social
rules—like “don’t cheat”—were covenants instead of contractual
161
conditions.
Without such a holding, the court noted, a corporation would
be free to condition an intellectual property license on any social
rule whatsoever. The critical language reads as follows:
Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or any software
copyright holder—could designate any disfavored
conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by
purporting to condition the license on the player’s
abstention from the disfavored conduct. The rationale
would be that because the conduct occurs while the
player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM
in order for it to run, the violation is copyright
159. See MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939–41 (9th Cir.
2010).
160. See id. at 939–40.
161. Id.
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infringement. This would allow software copyright owners
far greater rights than Congress has generally conferred
on copyright owners. 162
It is important to determine whether this holding is a matter
merely of contract interpretation or contractual construction. If
the court is merely advancing a statement of interpretation—that
is, that although in this case the “don’t bot” requirements were
contractual covenants and not license conditions, Blizzard may
simply rewrite the contract to make them such—the MDY case will
163
not lead to much. There are some cases like this, where a court
164
lets a consumer win on a narrow contractual ground. The losing
corporation then merely changes its contract language (which it
reserves the right to do unilaterally) and the case is a flash in the
pan—one customer wins but the case sets no useful precedent for
165
the protection of consumers more broadly.
However, if the MDY court’s decision that there was no
copyright infringement on behalf of WoW players stands for
something more than bare contractual interpretation, then
166
At issue is whether,
perhaps the case is not a flash in the pan.
going forward, Blizzard may simply amend its TOU and EULA to
expressly state that non-use of bots is a condition of the grant of the
intellectual property license. The fighting question is whether that
clear statement would satisfy the Ninth Circuit or other federal
162. Id. at 941.
163. Band, supra note 42 at 987 (“Only time will tell whether these holdings
will be limited to their specific facts, or will evolve into rules of more general
applicability.”).
164. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (remanding the case to the lower courts to determine whether the contract
was unenforceable and directing them to find the contract unenforceable if they
found it unconscionable); Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400
(N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding the terms of the contract unenforceable as they were
illusory).
165. This problem is expressed more broadly in the power imbalance of onetime participants and repeat players. Individuals (for example customers) are the
quintessential one-shot players. In the gaming context, a game is purchased once
(same with expansion packs). The repeat player (for example Blizzard) has
greater knowledge, power, and access to the legal system. For a broad treatment
of this, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053023; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come
out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
166. If it is not just a matter of a single contractual interpretation, then it can
result in a rule of general applicability and act as a tool to counteract copyright
creep.
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courts treating MDY as persuasive authority or whether the court’s
language here demonstrates something more: a limit on the use of
contractual clauses to control behavior that is, at best, tangentially
related to rights granted under the Copyright Act.
The language of the opinion quoted above is instructive in
addressing this question. The court appears to hold that a
contractual clause unrelated to a core right granted under § 106 of
the Copyright Act cannot be a condition of an intellectual property
167
This holding, clear on its face, in fact undermines the
license.
Ninth Circuit’s adherence to MAI, which has been roundly
168
criticized in the academic legal literature. Here is why: the MDY
court requires that there be a nexus between the clause in the
169
contract and the exercise of some right granted under § 106.
The court’s common-sense ruling was that Warden was not a copyprotection program: it sought to prevent the use of unauthorized
add-ons, not to prevent copying of the WoW executable. Indeed,
Blizzard has little interest in preventing the copying of the WoW
170
executable and in fact hands it out for free. Since users must pay
for an account and a subscription, Blizzard makes its money not
from selling the software client but from the account subscription
171
Thus, there are no copy protections on Blizzard clients—
fees.
one can simply download the latest client for free from the
Internet. Of course, in order to play the game one must set up an
account and a subscription.
But this common sense analysis flies straight in the face of
MAI’s insane decision that a copy of software is made every time a

167. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941.
168. The legal academic response to MAI has been deeply negative. See
Perzanowski, supra note 40, at 1075 (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive
failings and policy considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine); see, e.g., Band, supra
note 42; Carver, supra note 20, at 1954 (“To determine whether title to a copy has
been transferred, courts should look to whether the transferee has a right of
perpetual possession of the copy. This is the key factor that distinguishes sales and
gifts on the one hand, and leases and lending on the other.”); Shikowitz, supra
note 42 (detailing the two main criticisms, interpretive failings and policy
considerations, of the RAM copy doctrine); Von Lohmann, supra note 42.
169. Von Lohmann, supra note 42.
170. Sign up for the Free World of Warcraft Starter Edition, BATTLE.NET,
https://us.battle.net/account/creation/wow/signup/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2011)
(offering new users the opportunity to play the first twenty WoW levels for free).
171. See Subscription Options, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/support
/article.xml?locale=en_US&articleId=21450&pageNumber=1&searchQuery=paym
ent (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (offering month-to-month, three month, and six
month subscriptions).
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computer loads software from the hard disk into RAM.172
Proponents of Blizzard’s position in the MDY case must have
suffered a moment of surreality in reading the Ninth Circuit
opinion. The court noted that absent its holding to the contrary, a
copyright holder “could designate any disfavored conduct during
software use as copyright infringement” and required there to be a
173
nexus between any such clause and a right granted by § 106.
That right would be, in the Blizzard proponent’s eyes, the core
right to make copies under the Copyright Act. As the court
explained: “The rationale would be that because the conduct
occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software code
into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright
infringement. This would allow software copyright owners far
greater rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright
174
owners.”
This is an innovative challenge to the copyright status quo.
The court first requires a nexus between a contractual clause and a
175
right protected under the Copyright Act. The court then implies
that, as a matter of law, the copy created by copying the software
176
from hard drive to RAM does not satisfy this requirement. This is
frankly difficult reasoning to square with the court’s upholding of
MAI and the RAM copy doctrine in its discussions of ownership,
first sale, and the essential step defense. In short, the court states
that it supports the RAM copy doctrine while simultaneously
holding that MAI RAM copies do not satisfy the nexus requirement
of tying the contractual clause to a right granted by the Copyright
177
Act.
Thus, although MDY has been criticized in legal academic
literature as just another application of the RAM copy doctrine,
bad licensee/ownership intuitions, and the failure of the First Sale
178
doctrine online, it appears to me to offer instead a real chance
for pro-consumer doctrines to crystallize even in the Ninth Circuit,
172. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (“[W]e hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under
the Copyright Act.”).
173. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 954.
177. See id. at 938, 941 (reiterating the RAM copy doctrine and later rejecting
that it can tie a contractual clause to a right under the Copyright Act as it would go
against congressional intent under copyright).
178. See Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1035–53.
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the heart of the MAI doctrine. 179 The MDY holding directly
undermines MAI by holding that a rule, unrelated to a right
protected by copyright, cannot be redrafted so as to become a
condition on a grant of an intellectual property license. Doing so,
the court plainly states, would be beyond the power granted to
180
This removes corporations’
copyright holders by Congress.
greatest tool in denying legal rights to consumers: the power, even
in a losing case, to simply redraft the contract so that it clearly (and
even more abusively) restates in the corporation’s favor whatever
clause the court had interpreted in the case.
The court’s holding in MDY constitutes, if not a functional
overturning of MAI, a practical retrenchment and severe narrowing
of the grounds on which consumers can be found liable for
copyright infringement for performing actions that are outside of
the scope of their EULAs. Further, this holding offers some serious
hope to third-party providers of software that they will not be liable
for copyright infringement for the actions of their customers that
are in contravention of a contract the third-party software provider
may not even be aware of.
The holding is even more exciting for gamers and third-party
software providers because it has ramifications for the DMCA.
First, I should reiterate that for § 1201(a) claims, the Ninth Circuit
in MDY rejected a nexus requirement and held that access to
copyrighted material can be conditioned on any requirement (e.g.,
you must wear hot pink while logging in) that the copyright holder
181
deems appropriate, expedient, or even hilarious. But the court’s
179. The Ninth Circuit is where MAI and its progeny were decided. See, e.g.,
Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 769 (9th Cir. 2006).
Other circuits have approached the issue of copies in RAM differently. See, e.g.,
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–29 (2d Cir. 2008)
(finding that both the Copyright Act’s embodiment and durational requirements
need to be met in order for a data stream to be fixed). The Second Circuit’s
decision presented a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in that it looked at the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in MAI that RAM copies are made to where they can be
made. Id. at 128.
180. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941.
181. See id. at 952 (“[W]e conclude that a fair reading of the statute . . .
indicates that Congress created a distinct anti-circumvention right under §
1201(a) without an infringement nexus requirement.”). When an EULA becomes
a technological measure, a contract can then condition access on its terms, say
wearing a specific color or refraining from certain behavior in order to gain
access, and such access is also agreement to the terms. See ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing that U.C.C. § 2-204(1)
provides for different formations of contracts, such as a prompt on a computer
screen, which can prevent access). “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer
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holding that WoW players do not commit any intellectual property
infringement whatsoever when they break the EULA’s “play nice”
rules does in fact limit the ability of copyright holders to bring
182
Unlike § 1201(a), which the
some claims under the DMCA.
court held applies to any condition placed on access to works
183
protected under the Copyright Act, § 1201(b) directly references
technological measures that protect a right of a copyright holder
184
under the Act.
The court took this to mean that while § 1201(a) access can be
conditioned on any condition the copyright holder might dream
up, § 1201(b) copy protection measures must be targeted at
185
protecting a right protected under the Act. And under the same
analysis, the court determined that there was no nexus between a
clause requiring players not to cheat in a game and any right
186
The MDY court
granted under § 106 of the Copyright Act.
likewise held that § 1201(b) claims could not be brought when
players breach licenses because, again, the Warden program was
not a copy protection program and did not protect any right
187
granted to the copyright holder under the Act.
In short, only Blizzard’s § 1201(a) claims remain (besides the
state law interference with contract claims). This is important
because although the Ninth Circuit decided that the Warden
program “allowed access” to a protected work, that reasoning is
decidedly both in the minority and against the common sense
188
reading of the statute as explained in Lexmark and Chamberlain.
would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license
at leisure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software splashed
the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without indicating
acceptance.” Id. If you fail to click agree and still use the software, then you have
circumvented a technological measure. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006)
(“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.”).
182. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941.
183. Id. at 944.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 945–46.
186. Id at 940–41.
187. Id. at 954–55.
188. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528,
533, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the relationships between rights under the
Copyright Act and the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, and determining
that the anti-circumvention provisions do not grant a new right); Chamberlain
Grp., Inc. v. Skyline Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192–1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(interpreting the provisions of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, looking
to the Copyright Act and congressional intent, and finding that the anticircumvention provisions created a new cause of action and not a new property
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The court in MDY correctly stated that a customer does not gain
access to the WoW component, its service, or any of its elements,
189
through the Warden program. The customer gains access to the
copyrighted works in all of their forms by buying a copy of the
190
This argument has generally done quite well in courts
game.
191
nationwide, and thus the last ground for DMCA liability in the
Ninth Circuit hangs by a fairly slender jurisprudential thread.
2.

Antitrust and Copyright Misuse

I have focused here on what there is to celebrate in the MDY
decision. This is because the response to the case has been
192
There is
generally critical—a “glass half empty” approach.
certainly much about the case to criticize. The court continues the
mistaken Ninth Circuit approach in MAI and Wall Data with respect
193
to first sale and essential step analyses. These deprive buyers of
software from the basic protections of ownership that Congress
intended to extend to software purchasers.
Similarly, there is much to criticize in the Ninth Circuit’s
treatment of copyright misuse and antitrust issues in the case. The
Ninth Circuit seems to have misunderstood its own precedent and
the facts of the current case. MDY’s argument on appeal was that
Blizzard was misusing its state-granted copyright monopoly to
extend its control to the aftermarket for third-party
194
The Ninth Circuit inexplicably determined that
modifications.
MDY had not raised issues of fact regarding Blizzard’s actions
because, the court noted, Blizzard was not using its copyright

right where circumvention is infringement and copyright protection would be
implicated).
189. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 953.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see, e.g., Lexmark, 387 F. 3d at 546 (“It is not Lexmark’s authentication
sequence that ‘controls access’ to the Printer Engine Program . . . . It is the
purchase of a Lexmark printer that allows ‘access’ to the program.”).
192. See, e.g., Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1015–16; Corynne McSherry, A Mixed
Ninth Circuit Ruling in MDY v. Blizzard: WoW Buyers Are Not Owners—But Glider Users
Are Not Copyright Infringers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/12/mixed-ninth-circuit-ruling-mdy-v-blizzardwow; Venkat & Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Opinion in Glider/WoW Bot
Case—MDY Industries v. Blizzard, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2010, 9:41
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/12/messy_follow_up.htm.
193. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–39 (outlining that defenses based on
ownership, such as essential step, are not available if a user licenses the software
instead of owning it).
194. Id. at 941.
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control to drive out another maker of an MMORPG. 195 This is
simply wrong because it focuses on the primary market rather than
the aftermarket. A well-known, relevant precedent, Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, held that an industry-dominating
camera manufacturer could not leverage its position in the camera
196
Kodak was not
market to take over the aftermarket for film.
using its market position to control the camera market but to
197
extend its control into the aftermarket. Similarly, the Chamberlain
and Lexmark courts, although they did not base their holdings on
antitrust or anticompetition, were clearly concerned about
permitting a garage door maker to leverage its position into control
198
of the generic remote control market or permitting a printer
manufacturer to leverage its market position into control over the
199
Even MAI itself was superseded in its
printer cartridge market.
actual, narrow holding by Congress in the DMCA out of a concern
that copyright holders would seize control of the aftermarket for
200
repairs or computer servicing. All of these cases have been about
195. Id. at 951, 957.
196. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 452–53
(1992).
197. Id. at 481–82 (identifying the following two separate markets affected by
Kodak: products and service). “Kodak . . . contends that, as a matter of law, a
single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under the
Sherman Act. We disagree. The relevant market for antitrust purposes is
determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners.” Id.
198. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing Chamberlain’s arguments as effectively granting
control of aftermarkets based upon the addition of a “single copyrighted sentence
or software fragment to its product”). “Chamberlain’s construction of the DMCA
would allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket
monopolies—a practice that both the antitrust laws . . . and the doctrine of
copyright misuse . . . normally prohibit.” Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at
455; Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.
2003)). The court rejects this based on the doctrine of fair use as Chamberlain’s
DMCA construction would allow two parties to contract around the fair use right
“through a combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to
repeal the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work.” Id. at
1202.
199. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
551 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) (“Automobile manufacturers, for
example, could control the entire market of replacement parts for their vehicles
by including lock-out chips. Congress did not intend to allow the DMCA to be
used offensively in this manner, but rather only sought to reach those who
circumvented protective measures ‘for the purpose’ of pirating works protected by
the copyright statute.”).
200. See Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Computer Programs, 17 U.S.C. §
117(c) (2006) (creating an exemption from infringement for computer repair
and maintenance).
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a manufacturer seeking to control the aftermarket, not the
manufacturer’s primary market. Thus, for the court to have held
MDY’s copyright misuse and antitrust claims inactionable as a
matter of law seems to be an amateur mistake.
But the court’s error is not merely one of ignoring or
misstating precedent. It is a particularly dangerous mistake given
201
Blizzard has in fact used its power over its
Blizzard’s history.
copyrights in its video games to leverage control over extremely
202
One case in point is Blizzard’s takeover of
different industries.
the electronic sports market. Blizzard’s original StarCraft game was
not only enjoyable to play, but enjoyable to watch. Organizations
in other countries began to develop StarCraft (and the StarCraft
sequel, Brood War) into an electronic sport (e-sport). The Korean
Electronic Sports Association (KeSPA) developed StarCraft
sportscasting into a mega-hit industry with professional leagues of
203
players and prime time broadcasting of matches.
However, once this market for e-sports was sufficiently
developed, Blizzard took it over. It revoked KeSPA’s licensing
approval on the grounds that KeSPA had permitted broadcast of
Blizzard’s intellectual property without proper permission;
arranged licenses with a different, more pliable set of
organizations; and set out to take the e-sport global with the release

201. Blizzard does not hesitate to enforce the terms of its agreements (EULAs
and TOU). See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th
Cir. 2010) (seeking to enforce a “no cheating” provision in a license agreement
and TOU, and essentially driving a company out of business); Davidson & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom.
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 633–37 (8th Cir. 2005) (suing a
company for creation of a rival online forum to play Blizzard games for free in
violation of copyright and license agreement terms); Consent Permanent
Injunction at 2, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. 07-589 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2007), available at http://virtuallyblind.com/files/Peons
_Injunction.pdf (dealing with a suit over what Blizzard found to be cheating by a
company that facilitated enhanced gold farming in WoW).
202. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939; Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633–37. Blizzard
exercised its legal muscle to control the aftermarket in add-on programs and to
eliminate spamming on in-game chatting by preventing Peons4hire from
continuing to do business. See Consent Permanent Injunction, supra note 201, at
2; see also Don Southerton, Legal Battle—Korea’s MBC Game vs. Blizzard
Entertainment’s StarCraft, KOREA LEGAL.ORG (Dec. 5, 2010), http://
www.koreaexpertwitness.com/blog/tag/blizzard-entertainment/ (discussing the
popularity of StarCraft in South Korea, the league, its history, and the emerging
legal battle over control of the emerging lucrative market of StarCraft as a
professional sport).
203. See Southerton, supra note 202.
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of the equally popular StarCraft II title. 204 Thus, Blizzard has a
proven track record of waiting to see how markets for their
products develop, including industries and aftermarket uses that
are quite different from what Blizzard originally anticipated, and
then taking the market over. It is as if the inventor of baseball
suddenly laid claim to the World Series or if the inventor of
basketball suddenly revoked the ability of the NBA to broadcast
games or even film backyard pickup games of HORSE.
The same is true of the aftermarket add-on market. Blizzard
has routinely taken the best add-ons—for example, CTRaid or the
various aggression meters used to measure which party member a
monster would attack next—and incorporated them into Blizzard’s
205
The new ruling went against the Ninth
own WoW interface.
Circuit’s prior decision. Blizzard uses the add-on market as a test
bed for its UI and incorporates the most successful add-ons into its
206
Given this background and history, especially
interface.
Blizzard’s history of encouraging interface add-on innovation, and
then retracting rights to those innovations for its own purposes, the
court should have looked more deeply at the anticompetition and
copyright misuse claims in this case.
C. Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control
In this section, I offer an analysis of the contractual holdings of
MDY in light of the broader issues at stake in the arena of
207
contractual control of online communities.
There are several competing ways to view the cases. One
approach, described earlier, is to lump together all cases that have
a pro-DMCA bent and separate them all from those that seem to be
trying to limit the ambit of the DMCA. Broadly, the pro-DMCA
cases have the easier statutory reading job and the harder job
reconciling the statutory language with Congress’s stated intention
208
not to negatively impact fair use or imbalance copyright rights.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Yong Ming Kow & Bonnie Nardi, Who Owns the Mods?, FIRST
MONDAY (May 3, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index
.php/fm/article/view/2971/2529; Matthew McCurely, Addon Spotlight: Blizzard’s
Built-in Raid Profiles, WOW INSIDER (July 7, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://wow.joystiq.com/2011/07/07/addon-spotlight-blizzards-built-in-raidprofiles/#continued.
206. Patch 1.3.5 Now Available on PTR, STARCRAFT II: WINGS OF LIBERTY (July 13,
2011), http://us.battle.net/sc2/en/blog/2983578#blog.
207. MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939–41.
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006).
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The anti-DMCA cases have the harder statutory job but an easier
time explaining why the entire market for generic television
remote controls should not disappear because of some incautious
statutory wording. This is the familiar sorting of cases and I raise it
because I think that it is not as good of a sorting mechanism as the
approach I outline here.
It may be better to view the law unfolding in this area as courts
contributing tools to a toolbox rather than as courts taking sides in
a game of backyard football with the DMCA as a scrimmage line.
In the broader context, courts have been groping for tools to
control significant overreaches in online contracts, especially massmarket consumer contracts that purport to govern significant
portions of users’ everyday lives or effect mass transfers of
209
consumers’ intellectual property interests. For example, one can
easily imagine a court grasping at contractual straws to invalidate
an agreement between Microsoft and its users that transfers to
Microsoft the IP rights in any creative works written with Microsoft
Word or purports to ban users from using any non-approved thirdparty programs in conjunction with a Microsoft operating system.
This is of course what the Blizzard EULA does, and it is only the
fact that Microsoft has a passé reputation for antitrust violations—
and Blizzard does not yet—that keeps the Blizzard EULA alive.
The broader context has seen the revival of nearly-defunct
contract doctrines, such as adhesion, unconscionability,
illusoriness, and now the distinction between covenants and
210
as slowly coalescing limits on contractual
conditions,
overreaching online. These doctrines sometimes become stronger
than their old common-law origins. For example, recent cases have
held that online TOUs that reserve the right to unilaterally change
the agreement are illusory, since the service provider in fact is
211
Similarly, in a well-known 2007 decision,
making no promises.
209. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–41 (stating the court’s approach using
conditions and covenants and a nexus between any such condition and a right
granted by § 106); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1110–12 (9th Cir.
2010) (establishing a three point framework to determine if a purchaser of
software is an owner or licensee); see also Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006) (illustrating the same framework as
Vernor).
210. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939.
211. See Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
(“[T]here is nothing in the Terms and Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from
unilaterally changing any part of the contract other than providing that such
changes will not take effect until posted on the website.”); Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 607–08 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the TOUs governing
a virtual world—Second Life—were unconscionable in part
because the game creator reserved to itself the unilateral right to
212
ban players and expropriate all of their virtual property.
This is the context in which MDY is properly situated: one in
which courts have increasingly gotten questions of online contract
right but have persisted in misinterpreting Copyright Act
congressional protections of consumers against overreaching by
copyright holders. MDY is the latest in this series of cases. The
Ninth Circuit persists in refusing first sale and essential step rights
to consumers on the shaky legal grounds that a customer who buys
software in fact buys nothing other than a license right which may
be taken away at any time and the scope of which may be
unilaterally altered by the copyright holder on a whim.
Consistent with the broader trend in Internet law, what the
Ninth Circuit gets quite wrong as a matter of intellectual property
213
law, it gets right as a matter of contractual interpretation. The
Ninth Circuit noted that these sorts of use restrictions cannot be
enforced as intellectual property conditions unrelated to the
214
exercise of any right protected under the Copyright Act. This is a
curious holding, given Ninth Circuit precedent in MAI and Wall
Data stating that any copying of the software into RAM is a copy
and thus any condition that governs the terms under which that
RAM copy may be made is properly deemed a condition of the
215
license. The Ninth Circuit has therefore indeed adopted a nexus
requirement—between a clause of a contract purporting to be a
condition and some right granted under the Copyright Act—and
has held that a RAM copy cannot satisfy that requirement. There is
no other way to make sense of the court’s holding.
212. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595–97, 608–10.
213. Compare MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939–41 (outlining the difference
between covenants and conditions in a license agreement, and explaining that
terms in a license agreement unrelated to a protected right under the Copyright
Act can’t be enforced under copyright law), with id. at 942–48 (interpreting the
anti-circumvention statutory regime and finding a new right of access, yielding
copyright protection, created under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)).
214. Id. at 940–42.
215. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that a copy made by a licensee is a violation of the license
agreement and is also a copyright infringement); supra note 16 and accompanying
text (discussing RAM copy doctrine); see also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 784–86 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that defendant was a licensee
of the software and therefore infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by copying the
software and installing it on several computers in violation of the license
agreement).
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It is, of course, entirely possible that the Ninth Circuit will
lapse back into a rote acceptance of the characterization of the
license itself of what constitutes a covenant and what constitutes a
condition. If that were the case, MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc. would be merely a flash in the pan, a one-shot
interpretation of a contract that would be promptly papered over
by making the contractual clause at issue expressly a condition of
the grant of the license. But I do not think that is the likely or the
proper reading of the case. First, Blizzard’s license did purport to
condition the grant of the license on compliance with all terms in
216
the EULA and TOU. The court found that that express language
was not enough, given the lack of a nexus between the right
claimed (the right to control consumers’ ability to do business with
other software providers) and the exercise of any right granted
217
under the Copyright Act.
Equally important, I do not think the Ninth Circuit will shy
away from looking to the realities of a transaction and past the
formal characterization of the license agreement. On the same day
that the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in MDY Industries, LLC v.
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. the same panel heard another first sale
218
The court asked in Vernor whether a
case, Vernor v. Autodesk.
buyer of software who purchases in contravention of the seller’s
promise to the copyright holder not to sell may then resell the
software free and clear on eBay. Although that case also denied the
buyer any first sale rights and denied the eventual downstream
purchaser any essential step defense, Vernor did set out a three219
The court treated
prong test for the determination of first sale.
the characterization of the transaction as a license as only the
220
beginning of the inquiry. Thus, the growing trend, even where
courts are giving copyright holders the most leeway, is to look to
the underlying realities of the transaction and not give dispositive
221
weight to the characterization of the agreement itself.
216. See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 938–39.
217. Id. at 940–41.
218. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
219. Id. at 1111–12.
220. Id. at 1112–15 (addressing policy implications and four additional
arguments advanced by Vernor, notably the circuit split and the underlying
economic realities of the transaction, which were all rejected).
221. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169–72 (W.D. Wash.
2008) (discussing the precedent in Wise and contrary results in subsequent Ninth
Circuit decisions and the MAI Trio which gave dispositive weight to agreements
and deciding in line with Wise). “Taking direction solely from Wise, the court . . .
concludes that the transfer . . . was a sale.” Id. at 1170–72. The court based this
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There is another challenge to my analysis based on Vernor that
222
It required
is worth noting. Vernor was an after-market control.
223
This
the buyer of Autodesk software not to resell that software.
seems to run directly counter to Lexmark and Chamberlain. Thus, a
hypothetical interlocutor might ask: “How is it possible to align—as
I do—MDY with Chamberlain and Lexmark when it is so very clear
that the Ninth Circuit intends to keep rubber-stamping copyright
holders’ use of copyright powers to extract control over secondary
markets (as did Autodesk when it shut down Vernor’s eBay resales of
the AutoCAD software)?”
I have three answers. First, the Ninth Circuit has since further
tacked back toward limiting direct aftermarket resale control by
reaffirming the first sale doctrine’s application to digital music
224
stored on CDs in UMG v. Augusto. That case held that a “Not for
Sale” license slapped onto promotional music CDs could not
225
Second, the
prevent their eventual resale by the recipients.
aftermarket controls in Autodesk were different from those in MDY,
Chamberlain, and Lexmark. It’s an easy distinction to miss—in fact
the MDY court itself missed it and, thus, gave the anticompetition
claims in the case short shrift. Autodesk deals with the ability of a
copyright holder to control aftermarket sales of its own copyrighted
material. Lexmark, Chamberlain, and MDY deal with the attempt by a
copyright holder to wipe out someone else’s business plan based on
interoperability: a generic garage door opener that works with your
garage, a refilled printer cartridge that works with your printer, or a
software add-on that works with your video game. Thus, the case
that stands most in opposition to Lexmark, Chamberlain, and MDY in
this case would not be Vernor; rather, it would be Blizzard
determination on the underlying facts of the transaction and the terms in the
agreements. Id.; see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190–91 (9th Cir.
1977) (identifying the license given but then proceeding to analyze the
transactions to determine if any of them may be considered sales for the purpose
of the first sale doctrine); Shikowitz, supra note 42, at 1016–17 (describing Ninth
Circuit precedent in Wise and Vernor and their focus on the underlying economic
realities—instead of relying upon a software provider’s EULA exclusively—of a
software purchase and whether it leads to a license or ownership).
222. See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111–12 (stating that Autodesk reserved title to
release fourteen copies and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions).
These transfer and use restrictions effectively control the aftermarket by limiting
the purchase to a license and restricting what the user may do.
223. Id.
224. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding on first sale grounds that license purporting to restrict use of CDs to
promotional use only did not prohibit recipients from selling the CDs).
225. Id. at 1182–83.
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Entertainment’s own prior victory over creators of an interoperable
server for the fabulously successful Starcraft game, as set out in
226
Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway, better known below (and
227
more descriptively titled) as Blizzard Entertainment v. BnetD.
But the most important distinction of all is the cleanest and
the clearest. The district and circuit courts in MDY agreed that
certain kinds of contractual rules—social rules regarding how to
behave and play the game—were not enforceable as copyright
infringements but merely as breaches of contract. The district
court and Ninth Circuit came to different conclusions merely
because they differed in their characterization of whether a ban on
“botting” was a social rule governing game play or an intellectual
property condition controlling the conditions under which a copy
of the software (again, from hard disk into RAM) could be made.
To the software industry, this difference between social rule
and intellectual property use restriction might not matter much;
but the difference matters more to consumers.
Online
communities are heavily regulated by these kinds of social rules. As
noted above, Facebook’s TOU restrict what citizens can and cannot
228
The
say via one of the (currently) top communications media.
public has stopped communicating on public street corners or via
content-neutral telephone lines. More people use Facebook to
communicate—and more people therefore communicate under
229
These rules need to be
Facebook’s rules—than use e-mail.
pruned back to protect consumers, to protect communications,
and to protect communities.
It is precisely this distinction that both the district court below
and the Ninth Circuit noted. There is a difference in kind between
rules like “don’t resell” and rules like “don’t cheat.” Courts may
vacillate over enforcing “don’t resell,” but the tide appears to be
turning against rules like “don’t cheat” or “don’t discuss certain
topics using our service.” Companies can, of course, enforce these
226. See Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632
(8th Cir. 2005).
227. Davidson & Associates, Inc. is now Blizzard and Internet Gateway was the
creator of BnetD.
228. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, para. (5)(2) (Apr. 26,
2011), http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (“We can remove any content
or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement.”).
229. See Facebook More Popular than E-mail, Study Shows, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 13,
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,509033,00.html (explaining that
networking sites, of which Facebook is the most popular, account for ten percent
of time spent online, which is greater than e-mail).
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rules as individual breaches of contract but decreasingly as
infringements upon copyright.
There is one final potential challenge to the lens through
which I view these cases. This competing approach simply sorts the
cases according to whether they involve physical objects or
intangible intellectual property. So, interoperable garage door
openers and printer cartridges are fine; interoperable game servers
and botting add-ons are not. The problem with this approach is
230
that it turns on a distinction with utterly no difference. There is
little difference between an MP3 on a CD and an MP3 on a
computer hard drive. Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrates the
tensions in these cases. The Ninth Circuit recently enforced aftermarket controls on eBay sales of AutoCAD CDs (in Vernor) but
refused to enforce after-market controls on sales of promotional
231
music CDs (in Augusto). One kind of CD is just as tangible as the
other.
Instead of turning on tangibility, the cases may instead turn on
the kind of control that the copyright holder was trying to assert
and what the copyright holder offered in return. In Vernor,
Autodesk offered its customer a discounted ability to upgrade to
new software in return for the promise not to sell the old software.
That is not a bad trade. On the other hand, in UMG v. Augusto,
one gets the sense that the court does not approve of “drive-by”
contracting in which a music promoter sends out the CDs with
license terms attached and the recipient gets nothing in return nor
has any say in the matter.
The question for purposes of the current analysis is whether
the mass-market video game contract at issue in MDY is more like
the upgrade contract in Vernor or the drive-by contract of adhesion
in Augusto. Reasonable minds may differ on that question while
still reaching consensus that the CDs in Augusto were no more
intrinsically tangible than were the CDs in Vernor. The sorting of
cases along a tangibility-intangibility axis lacks explanatory power.
Each of these considerations militates, I believe, against the
MDY holding by acting as a mere flash in the pan or merely
chalking the case up as another win for the copy-control camp. Of
course, MDY is one case. But it is important not to underestimate
230. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The
(Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2007); see also Joshua A.T.
Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005).
231. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1182–83 (9th Cir.
2011).
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the power of the holding. Few academics would miss the
significance of a case severely limiting Microsoft’s or Google’s
power to constrain its consumers’ everyday lives via software license
agreements. Video games still suffer when it comes to being taken
seriously, although they have been a larger industry than
232
Blizzard is a major
Hollywood for the better part of a decade.
player in video game circles and has become a recognized name in
legal circles as well. Under its prior name of Davidson & Associates,
Blizzard has previously set important precedent on the interaction
233
of EULAs and the DMCA. A holding that Blizzard customers did
not commit any kind of copyright infringement whatsoever when
they contravened express terms of the WoW EULA not only lifts the
cloud of copyright infringement from over the heads of the 11–12
million players of WoW, but also substantially impacts the balance
of power between international corporations and hundreds of
millions of video game players worldwide.
IV. CONCLUSION
The MDY court held that between 11 and 12 million WoW
players cannot be held liable for copyright infringement if they
violate the terms of Blizzard’s EULA because they would merely
violate a contractual covenant not a condition of an intellectual
property license. The legal world has, in response, largely
shrugged because the case seems to align with the depressing run
of cases that run roughshod over the first sale doctrine and
essential step defense.
This article has attempted to demonstrate the value of an
alternative approach. It has suggested a shift in focus toward
232. See Tom Chatfield, Videogames Now Outperform Hollywood Movies,
THEGUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology
/gamesblog/2009/sep/27/videogames-hollywood (noting that in Britain in 2008,
gaming eclipsed combined sales of DVD and music and was over four times the
cinema box office take home, and further noting the recognition that gaming has
received as an industry while concerns of its recognition as a legitimate medium
remain). “A game, it’s understood, can look spectacular, but it will have little to
offer its audience in the way of values, insights or craftsmanship.” Id; see also
FACTBOX-Initial Sales of Video Games vs. Movie Blockbusters, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2009,
3:01 pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/videogames
-idUSN1032711620091110 (comparing side-by-side sales of videogames and movies
in the United States with movies slightly ahead).
233. See Davidson & Assocs, v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a software developer gave up its fair use right to reverse engineer software for
interoperability purposes when an employee clicked “I Agree” on a Blizzard
EULA).
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contract interpretation as an alternative and equally viable means
for shielding consumers from overreaching mass-market contracts.
This contractual interpretation approach appears to have been
persuasive to a court that otherwise continues to lead the charge in
denying Copyright Act protections to consumers. Further, the
contract approach led the Ninth Circuit to seriously undermine
MAI and its progeny through its assertion that a contractual clause
must both be expressly stated as a condition and must have a nexus
with the assertion of some right protected under the Copyright Act
in order to act as a condition on an intellectual property license.
Although the Ninth Circuit splits from the Federal and Sixth
Circuits by holding that DMCA claims need not be based on core
rights granted in the Copyright Act, it nevertheless joins a
nationwide trend in looking to the realities of a purported license
transaction in order to limit the untrammeled ability of a
corporation to assert control over aftermarket consumer behavior
through threat of copyright infringement. What remains to be
seen is whether the decision will act as a catalyst to bridge some of
the doctrinal gaps between circuits and thus accelerate the trend
toward limiting mass-market contractual control over online
communities.
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